

APPENDIX I

OVERVIEW OF THE BATTLES

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For some five months after the Mine Run campaign there was little action in the Virginia theater, the only sizable operation there being Kilpatrick's raid on Richmond (February-March, 1864), made in hopes of liberating the thousands of Union prisoners of war held there. By hard and skillful riding, Kilpatrick reached the city's fortifications, found them more heavily garrisoned than he had anticipated, and had to withdraw down the Peninsula to Fort Monroe. Part of his advance guard was cut off and its commander killed.

Winter was hard on Lee's army. Clothing was scarce, and horses and men alike went hungry. Early in December, Davis tried to persuade Lee to take over the command of Bragg's defeated army in Georgia, but once more Lee chose to remain in Virginia. Johnston then replaced Bragg.

Early in March, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant took command as general in chief of all the Union armies—approximately 33,000 men in seventeen different commands. Halleck, though replaced by Grant, remained in Washington in the newly created position of chief of staff, in which capacity he took care of the mass of operational and administrative details and served as a communications link between Grant and Lincoln. Grant himself decided to accompany the Army of the Potomac, since it confronted the strongest remaining Confederate army and also because it would be easier for him to maintain communications with Washington from its headquarters than from that of a western army. Meade retained command of the Army of the Potomac. Generally speaking, Grant gave him only broad strategic missions, leaving to him the tactical decisions necessary to implement them. This arrangement was awkward but unavoidable; the two men managed it with a minimum of personal friction.

Meade had reorganized his infantry into three corps. This made the army as a whole somewhat easier to handle, but it also had an adverse effect upon its morale. Men from the disbanded I and III Corps had been proud of their organizations and therefore resented being transferred. Moreover, the corps which received them, being already burdened with large numbers of raw recruits, had not had time to absorb them properly before the campaign began. All the cavalry was again concentrated in one corps under Sheridan, who also had recently been transferred from the west. Burnside's IX Corps, just returned from Knoxville, was at first directly under Grant, but became part of the Army of the Potomac on 24 May. Initially, it was employed to guard the railroads in the army's rear.

Grant's over-all plan was to destroy the two largest remaining Confederate armies—Lee's, in Virginia, and Johnston's, in Georgia. Meade was to operate against Lee—"Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also"; Sherman, against Johnston. Several minor offensives were organized to assist these two major ones. Butler, with 33,000 men, was to move against Richmond along the south bank of the James River; Sigel would advance up the Shenandoah Valley to destroy the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad; and Banks was to conduct operations against Mobile.

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Lee's position along the Rapidan was too strong to be taken by a frontal attack. An envelopment of his left flank would have the advantage of moving across favorable terrain, but it would expose the Union line of communications. An envelopment of Lee's right flank, on the other hand, would cover the Union communications and threaten Lee's. It would also place the Army of the Potomac and Butler's Army of the James in better position for mutual support. Its major drawback would be the necessity of advancing through the same Wilderness that had blinded Hooker the year before. Grant chose the Wilderness route around Lee's right flank.

During the night of 3 May, the Union forces moved to the fords across the Rapidan; on the 4th, Lee put his forces in motion to counter the Union move. Grant began his advance at midnight on 3 May in two columns, hoping to move rapidly enough to pass through the Wilderness before Lee could concentrate enough troops to offer effective opposition. Because of this need for speed, he left part of his artillery behind and took only essential supplies. Even so, these filled a wagon train between sixty and seventy miles long. The cavalry corps was again divided, with Meade sending one division ahead of each infantry column, while holding Brig. Gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert's in the rear to guard the lagging trains. Therefore, no cavalry was available to screen the exposed Federal right flank during the move through the Wilderness.

By virtue of hindsight, it now appears that Grant and Meade might have done better to send the whole of their cavalry corps ahead to seize the southern and western exits from the Wilderness and protect the passage of the rest of the army. The infantry and artillery could have moved in three columns, the third one using one or more of the fords farther downstream. The trains could have followed this eastern column, under the protection of some of Burnside's infantry. By this advancing on a wider front, and by starting at nightfall on 3 May instead of at midnight, Grant probably could have gotten through the Wilderness in one day. As it actually happened, the trains soon lagged behind, and the II and V Corps were halted in the Wilderness, as shown, early in the afternoon of 4 May to let them close up. Here, the two corps provided Lee with an excellent target.

Lee had been seeking an opportunity to launch another major offensive against the Army of the Potomac. Now, with that army reported on the march, he was in hopes that the new Federal commander would move through the Wilderness, where the superior numbers of the Union troops and their splendid artillery would be nullified by the tangled, unfamiliar terrain. Once the Federals had moved deep into the region, he planned to strike the flank of their marching columns. His initial dispositions, however, were poor. During the winter, it had been necessary to scatter the Army of Northern Virginia to enable the men to find ample supplies and food. But, when the Federals moved south, Lee was slow to concentrate. Stuart, who should have been scouting the line of the Rapidan, was still near Fredericksburg; Longstreet was at Gordonsville, some forty-two miles away, out of supporting distance. Had the Confederate army been concentrated on the morning of 5 May, it is possible that Lee might have overwhelmed Warren's and Hancock's Corps. One explanation for his delay may be that the Confederate intelligence service had failed to convince Lee that the Army of the Potomac was much larger than his own. Actually, as we have seen, it was nearly twice as large.

Consequently, the first clash on the morning of 5 May was a chance encounter. Ewell, advancing eastward along the Orange-Fredericksburg Turnpike at about 7:00 a.m.,

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collided with Warren, who was marching toward Parker's Store. The surprise was mutual.

Lee had wanted to avoid a general engagement until Longstreet arrived. Meade was only anxious to get out of the green maze of the Wilderness. So poorly had the cavalry of both armies performed that neither commander had any conception of the other's location and strength. Meade apparently thought that Warren had met a division-size delaying force left behind by Lee to cover a Confederate concentration farther south along the North Anna River. He ordered Warren to attack and to determine his foe's actual strength. Hancock was to halt at Todd's Tavern until this matter was settled. And Sedgwick was to cover Warren's right flank.

In accordance with Meade's orders, Warren sent Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin west along the turnpike. Gen. James S. Wadsworth moved off the road to prolong Griffin's left flank, while Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright (1st Division, VI Corps) advanced from Spottswood to support his right. Attacking vigorously, Griffin hustled Johnson's division back in some disorder, until Ewell put in his reserves. Wright, meanwhile, found his road so over-grown as to be impassable; Wadsworth lost his direction in the dense undergrowth and advanced to the northwest instead of to the southwest, thus exposing his left flank to Ewell's fire. Ewell counterattacked and recovered the ground originally held by Johnson. Then, having received orders to avoid an engagement until Longstreet arrived, he entrenched.

A. P. Hill's advance up the Orange Plank Road encountered a detachment from Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson's cavalry division. This detachment fell back slowly, using its repeating carbines effectively to check Hill's march. Meade at once realized the importance of holding the Brock Road, the loss of which would separate Hancock and Wilson from the rest of the army. He therefore ordered Brig. Gen. George W. Getty (2d Division, VI Corps) to move to the Orange Plank Road and, if possible, drive the Confederates there beyond Parker's Store. Hancock was ordered to countermarch to the Brock Road-Orange Plank Road junction and support Getty. In the meantime, Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford had thrown out a skirmish line to support the Union cavalry on the Orange Plank Road. Shortly thereafter, he received orders to send a brigade to support Griffin's attack. The brigade got lost, blundered into Ewell's line, and was badly mauled. Its defeat, and the gradual withdrawal of the cavalry, left Crawford somewhat isolated, and he pulled back.

Getty reached the Brock Road-Orange Plank Road junction about 11:00 a.m. and sent forward a skirmish line to establish contact with A. P. Hill's leading troops, which were still engaged with the Union cavalry a half-mile to the west. From prisoners captured in this first clash, Getty learned that two Confederate divisions were in front of him. He therefore constructed some light entrenchments and prepared to hold the crossroads until Hancock arrived.

In the meantime, the fight on the turnpike died down. Both sides gradually reorganized and fortified their lines. On the Orange Plank Road, Hill—also under orders to wait for Longstreet—took up the best available position and awaited orders. About 2:00 p.m., Hancock's corps began lining up on Getty's left flank. Getty expected an attack. Hancock thereupon ordered his leading units to throw up light breastworks.

The fighting had already assumed the frustrating characteristics that would represent it throughout. Numbers meant little. In fact, they were frequently an

encumbrance on the narrow trails. Visibility was limited, making it extremely difficult for officers to exercise effective control. Attackers could only thrash noisily and blindly forward through the underbrush, perfect targets for the concealed defenders. In attack or retreat, formations could rarely be maintained. In this near-jungle, the Confederates had the advantages of being, on the whole, better woodsmen than their opponents and of being far more familiar with the terrain. Federal commanders were forced to rely upon maps, which soon proved thoroughly unreliable. By 3:00 p.m., Lee was debating the possibility of seizing the Brock Road without bringing on a general engagement. Heth was dubious, but willing to try if so ordered. Before Lee could reach a decision, the Federals attacked.

Sometime after 3:15 p.m., Getty received orders to attack at once. Hancock's divisions were to support him. Meade wanted the attack made immediately, to take advantage of Longstreet's absence. Hancock, however, delayed to complete the line of hasty breastworks he had begun along his front. (This undoubtedly was an error, since it likewise gave Hill time to strengthen his position.) At 4:15 p.m., Getty went forward and quickly met savage resistance. Hancock at once reinforced Getty; Wilcox moved to support Heth. Fighting raged desperately until dark, the Confederates barely managing to hold their general line after repeated attacks and counterattacks. Despite their valiant defense, night found Hill's men shaken and somewhat scattered; their ammunition almost exhausted; and their right flank forced back by Col. Francis Barlow's last attack. Hill was too sick to exercise command; consequently, his position was not properly reorganized.

During the late afternoon, Meade sent Wadsworth across country to reinforce Hancock's right flank, and also ordered renewed attacks on Ewell's line. These attacks were costly and futile. Wadsworth found the woods almost impassable and was unable to get into action before dark.

Both armies planned to attack the next day (6 May). Lee sent word to Longstreet to hurry forward, planning to use his corps and Anderson's division to turn the Federal left flank and drive it across the Rapidan. Meanwhile, Grant ordered Hancock, Warren, Sedgwick, and Burnside to resume the attack at 5:00 a.m. (Burnside was to advance at 2:00 a.m. with two divisions to fill the gap between Warren and Hancock, and was to have them in position to attack at the required hour.) Since Hancock's line was too long for effective personal leadership in such terrain, he divided it into two commands—Gibbons on the left flank and Birney astride the Orange Plank Road. Prisoners had revealed that Longstreet was expected to attack that morning.

At 5:00 a.m., the Federal attack began—except for Burnside, who was still trying to find his way forward through the roadless tangle of undergrowth between the Turnpike and the Orange Plank Road. To the north, Ewell repulsed Sedgwick and Warren with heavy loss; to the south, Hill's men, struck in front and flank by Hancock's massive assault, broke and fled to the rear. Confederate artillery, firing across the open fields of the Tapp farm in Hill's rear, slowed the Union rush, but could not stop it. Except for the guns, Lee's entire right flank had crumbled.

But, shouldering through the rearward-bound wreck of Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, came Longstreet—his men remarking that the spectacle reminded them of Bragg's army. Lee was unusually excited; his subordinates had considerable trouble getting him to move farther to the rear. Longstreet went directly into action, stopping Birney, but meeting stubborn resistance as he attacked in his turn. A succession of

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assaults by both armies surged back and forth between the Brock Road and the Tapp farm. About 8:00 a.m., Meade sent Brig. Gen. Thomas G. Stevenson (1st Division, IX Corps), who had been held in reserve at Wilderness Tavern, to reinforce Hancock; ordered Warren and Sedgwick to renew their offensive; and sent Sheridan's cavalry against Longstreet's right rear.

At 7:00 a.m., Hancock had ordered Gibbon to send Barlow's division against the Confederate right flank, but only one brigade was dispatched, because of a series of apparent threats to the Federal left. The Federal command mistakenly believed that Pickett's division was with Longstreet, whereas he had, in fact been detached for garrison duty in the Richmond area. When prisoners captured on the Orange Plank Road did not include any of Pickett's men, it was thought that his division was being held in reserve for a decisive attack. Consequently, a detachment of Federal convalescents, who had become lost while attempting to rejoin their army, were at first mistaken for Confederate infantry—as was Stuart's cavalry when it appeared dismounted near Todd's Tavern. The result was that Barlow was held out of action during a critical period.

By 11:00 a.m., both sides were temporarily fought out. Birney had fallen back somewhat toward his original line. Sheridan, completely neglecting to cover the exposed flanks of the Union army, was engaged in a noisy and inconsequential brawl with Stuart around Todd's Tavern. Meade had ordered Sedgwick and Warren to stop their attacks, entrench, and assemble troops to reinforce Hancock.

The lull was deceptive. Longstreet, with Lee's approval, had prepared a Chancellorsville-style flank attack to roll up the Union line. A reconnaissance by Maj. Gen. Martin L. Smith, Lee's chief engineer, had discovered that Birney's south flank was unprotected and could be easily turned by an advance along the bed of an unfinished railroad which ran parallel to the Orange Plank Road. Longstreet directed one of his staff officers, Lt. Col. G. Moxley Sorrel, to assemble four brigades and carry out this attack, while he himself led an advance along the Orange Plank Road. (Apparently, he considered using some of the troops he had concentrated there for a second, deeper envelopment to get behind the Brock Road.)

The flank attack by the troops that Sorrel had collected (apparently actually commanded by Mahone) was immediately successful. Birney's line collapsing from left to right. Only Hancock's dominating leadership rallied it behind the entrenchments he had ordered built the day before along the Brock Road. Longstreet, pushing the Confederate drive forward, was accidentally wounded by his own men. Lee took over the direction of the attack, but found the troops too disordered by their advance through the underbrush to continue. It was 4:15 p.m. before they could be reorganized; then their attack collapsed in front of Hancock's defenses.

In the center, Burnside did not attack until 2:00 p.m.; Hill's divisions repulsed him.

To the north, Gordon's progress had been thwarted for most of the day. During the previous night, his scouts had discovered that the Union right flank was unprotected and that the Confederate left flank over-lapped it. However, Early, supported by Ewell, refused to let him attack. Finally, about 5:30 p.m., Lee visited Ewell's headquarters; Gordon stated his plan and secured Lee's approval. Though launched too late in the day to affect the outcome of the battle, his attack scored a handsome little success until darkness and Sedgwick's calm leadership halted it.

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During 7 May, the two armies lay behind their breastworks, separated by three-quarters of a mile of smoldering Wilderness. It had been a blind, blundering battle in which even the casualties inflicted remained in doubt: Union losses had been between 15,000 and 18,000; Confederate records are fragmentary, estimates varying from 7,750 to 11,400. Both Grant and Lee had shown great determination but no particular skill. Grant, especially, seems to have ignored the limitations that the terrain presented upon his attacks, and neither he, Meade, nor Sheridan had employed his cavalry corps properly.

Lee, too, had failed to use his cavalry properly, and so had created a situation in which he had to commit his forces piecemeal as they arrived on the field. He had failed in his attempt to seize the Brock Road, but had succeeded in turning both flanks of the larger Union army.

A year before, Hooker, commanding another Union army—just as large, and no more badly hurt—had accepted defeat and fallen back across the Rapidan. But now, as the day passed, indications multiplied that this time the Federal commander intended to shift to the southeast instead of retiring. To Lee, that meant that it would be necessary to hold the important road junction at New Spotsylvania Court House.

At 8:30 p.m., 7 May, the Army of the Potomac began to move as shown. Grant had studied the Confederate positions and concluded that they were too strong for a frontal attack. Warren and Sedgwick pulled out of line and marched for Spotsylvania; Burnside started for Aldrich; Hancock remained in position until the rest of the army had passed behind him, then moved to Todd's Tavern. It was a black night; roads were poor and hard to follow; and the march of some units was not well handled. Along the Brock Road, Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry fought a skillful delaying action against Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt's cavalry and Warren's infantry. Farther to the southeast, Wilson's Union cavalry drove that of Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser out of Spotsylvania.

It was around 8:30 a.m. of the 8th before Warren's leading infantry came out into the open ground near Alsop, pushing Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry slowly before them. Here, they were suddenly checked by Confederate infantry and artillery.

It was Longstreet's Corps, now under Anderson, and its presence was due to a combination of hard marching and good luck. Lee had ordered Anderson to withdraw from his position on the Orange Plank Road as soon as possible after dark, assemble his men for a rest, and start before 3:00 a.m. the next morning for Spotsylvania. Anderson began his withdrawal at 11:00 p.m., but could find no suitable area in which to halt his command (much of the woods along the Orange Plank Road having caught fire during the battle), and so continued on for the objective. En route the next morning, he halted for an hour to permit his men to cook breakfast. Shortly thereafter, he received a message from Stuart asking for help, and immediately pushed forward, arriving just in time to block Warren.

Wilson had held Spotsylvania for two hours. Now, the Confederate cavalry concentrated against him, and Sheridan ordered him to withdraw. At 1:00 p.m., Meade ordered Sedgwick to support an attack by Warren. Time was required to get the tired troops into position on strange ground and to coordinate Sedgwick's and Warren's efforts. As a result, the attack was not launched until late in the afternoon, and then it was rather half-hearted. Ewell arrived in time to protect Anderson's flank. On the Federal right, Hancock sent Col. Nelson A. Miles on a reconnaissance in force to Corbin's Bridge, just

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southwest of Todd's Tavern.

At 1:00 p.m., 8 May, as both armies concentrated around Spotsylvania, Grant ordered Sheridan to cut loose from the army, move around the left of Lee's army, and attack his cavalry. That done, Sheridan was to cut the railroads in the rear of the Confederate army; if circumstances required, he could move to the James River, south of Richmond, and draw supplies from Butler at Haxall's Landing before rejoining the Army of the Potomac.

This mission sprang from a clash between Meade and Sheridan over the latter's feeble and amateurish handling of the Federal horsemen. Sheridan's previous experience as a cavalryman had been only a short but creditable period of service as a regimental commander under Halleck in the west. He had not yet learned how to handle a corps--a condition not helped by the fact that, of his division commanders, Torbert had just been transferred from the infantry, while Wilson had recently been a very junior engineer officer. As noted, Sheridan had failed to screen the army's flanks. During the night march to Spotsylvania, his orders to his division commanders had been late, with the result that his cavalry blocked the advance of the infantry columns and failed to clear Fitzhugh Lee from Warren's line of march. On the other hand, Sheridan—whose great military virtue was expressed by a furious and undying pugnacity—was completely exasperated with his recent missions of guarding supply trains and protecting the flanks of the main army. Instead, he saw his task as that of first defeating the Confederate cavalry. It was on his offer to do this that Grant let him go.

The Cavalry Corps moved out on the 9th, riding slowly and confidently at the walk. Stuart followed in pursuit, leaving part of his force to cover Lee's flanks. The strength of Sheridan's column led him to suspect that Richmond might be the actual objective of this raid.

Sheridan rode deliberately south, destroying Confederate supply depots along his line of march. On the 10th, Stuart divided his command, leaving Brig. Gen. James B. Gordon to maintain contact with the Federal rear guard, while he himself took Fitzhugh Lee's division on a long detour that brought it to Yellow Tavern, between Richmond and the Federal column.

In Richmond, Bragg (who, having been relieved after Chattanooga and was now Davis' military advisor) could muster only some 4,000 home guards and convalescents--barely enough to man the city's fortifications, though he had ordered additional troops brought back from the James River front, where they were opposing Butler. Stuart may have hoped to fall on Sheridan's flank or rear if the Union commander attacked Richmond, or to hold Sheridan at Yellow Tavern until the reinforcements from the James arrived. The Union force, however, was too heavy to be held back, and Stuart's cavalry--not Richmond—was its objective. After a short, gallant defense, the Confederates broke. Stuart was mortally wounded. Gordon attacked the Federal rear, but was defeated and killed.

Sheridan then passed through the outer defenses of Richmond, but found the inner defenses too strong to overcome. Attempting to cross the Chickahominy River just south of Mechanicsville, he found the bridges destroyed and the opposite bank held by Confederate infantry and artillery, while the Richmond garrison and the remnants of Stuart's cavalry advanced against Sheridan's rear. The Union cavalry, however, was not to be cowed. Fighting front and rear, it bridged the Chickahominy under fire, drove back

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both Confederate forces, and rode on to Haxall's Landing. After a brief stay with Butler, Sheridan returned by way of White House and the west bank of the Mattaponi River, rejoining Grant at Chesterfield Station.

It was a bold raid, but—aside from killing Stuart—it did not seriously cripple the Confederate cavalry. And while it was in progress, Grant, like Lee at Gettysburg, was left blind in hostile territory.

On 9 May, both armies continued to close up. Lee carefully organized and entrenched his lines, emplacing artillery along the works to deliver enfilade fire on any attacking column. These works were constantly improved and expanded; in many places, a second line was constructed behind the first one. Obstacles constructed from felled trees were erected in front of the entrenchments.

It was extremely difficult for the Union forces to determine the actual extent, strength, or location of Lee's position, since much of it was concealed by trees and undergrowth. Moreover, the Confederate skirmish line had been pushed well forward to keep Union scouts and staff officers from reconnoitering it. One of these snipers picked off Sedgwick during the day.

On the Union side, Warren and Wright likewise improved their positions. Hancock came into line on the Federal right, and Burnside on the left. Burnside, with his usual penchant for misconstruing situations, encountered a small force of dismounted Confederate cavalry during his advance, mistook it for Confederate infantry, and so reported it to Grant. Sheridan and the Union cavalry had already gone on their raid to Richmond, leaving the Union command in the dark about the situation on its flanks and in its rear. Grant may have been left somewhat apprehensive by the Wilderness. At any rate, he became concerned that Lee's entire army was preparing an offensive against the new Union base of supplies at Fredericksburg, and he ordered Hancock to cross the Po River to his front, advance down its west bank, recross at the Blockhouse Bridge, and turn Lee's left flank.

Hancock promptly made an assault, crossing with three divisions against sporadic opposition, though the river was fifty feet wide and unfordable. Putting in three pontoon bridges to assure his communications, he then advanced southward, his progress hampered by the dense woods. Darkness stopped his advance, still short of the road running east to Blockhouse Bridge. (Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott's division of Hancock's corps was held in reserve, ready to reinforce Burnside, if the latter were attacked in his somewhat isolated position to the east.)

At early dawn on 10 May, Hancock reconnoitered the Blockhouse Bridge but found the Confederates strongly entrenched on the east bank. He therefore shifted farther south along the Po and crossed Col. John R. Brooke's brigade to establish a bridgehead in the Confederate rear. Lee's left flank was turned and his communications threatened. A rapid reinforcement of Hancock's advance was all that was required to force Lee out of position. But Grant, not appreciating the opportunity, had determined on a frontal assault. He ordered Meade to recall Hancock with two of his divisions and send him to Warren's position, where he was to arrange with Warren for a vigorous attack on Lee's fortified line at 5:00 p.m. (Since Hancock was the senior major general, he would command both his corps and Warren's.) Wright and Mott were also to attack at the appointed hour. Barlow's division was to remain on the west bank of the Po, in such a position that it could threaten the Confederate left, yet withdraw easily if needed to reinforce the main

attack.

The reason for this abandonment of a promising maneuver in favor of a Fredericksburg-type direct assault on the strongest sector of Lee's position has never been explained. Neither has it ever been positively determined whether the original decision was Meade's or Grant's; but Grant, as the senior officer with the army, was in the end responsible. This was the first serious failure of the anomalous system of command under which the Army of the Potomac had to finish the war. In effect, it was commanded by two generals--each with his own, occasionally jealous, staff; their respective responsibilities were never clearly defined. The result was frequently confusion; occasionally, it was worse.

On the 9th, Lee had received vague reports that Federal troops were operating on the west bank of the Po River. Alert to the danger of a Union offensive in that direction, he ordered Heth's division across the river to deal with this unidentified Federal force. Advancing by a circuitous route, Heth encountered Hancock's flank guards. Some skirmishing followed. When this was reported to Meade, he ordered Barlow recalled, since he did not wish to become involved in a battle west of the Po while preparing to launch his grand assault to the east.

One opportunity had come and gone. Probably, the best plan would have been to send Hancock across the Po in early morning of the 10th (instead of the late afternoon of the 9th) for an immediate, vigorous offensive. In this case, Lee would not have been warned of his advance in time to shift troops to meet him.

It is appropriate to note here that most of the senior officers of both armies still had not learned the futility of assaulting strongly held fortifications. Grant had seen his heaviest attacks on the Vicksburg defenses repulsed and Lee had witnessed the failure of his best troops at Gettysburg. The artillery of this period was devastating against troops caught in the open, but was relatively ineffective against crude breast-works and trenches. The explosive charges of its shells lacked the power necessary to destroy them, and its fuzes were too erratic to enable gunners to fire accurately and effectively. Wilderness/Spotsylvania illustrated, however, that one man well entrenched equaled three men in the open.

West of the Po River, Heth pushed his attack. The Union force now opposing him—two brigades, forming Barlow's rear guard—beat him off twice and successfully recrossed the river. (Heth, under the misapprehension that he had been dealing with an attempted Union offensive, flattered himself over the victory. Actually, his isolated division had been extremely fortunate in that the last elements of the II Corps were withdrawing by the time he launched his attack.) The Confederates then extended their entrenchments westward for approximately a mile along the road to Shady Grove Church.

Some time before 3:30 p.m., Warren reported that he was of the opinion that an immediate attack on his front would have an excellent chance of success. Meade authorized it and Warren moved up at about 4:00 p.m. with Wright's VI Corps on his left and Gibbon's division of the II Corps on his right. Warren led the attack in his full-dress uniform, but his courage proved better than his judgment. Some of his men broke through the tangles of underbrush and felled trees in front of the Confederate lines; a few even got into the first Confederate entrenchments, but most were either killed, wounded, or driven back. Raked by carefully planned Confederate crossfires, the whole attacking

force streamed back into its own lines.

Farther to the east, there was more planning. Wright, after careful reconnaissance of the Confederate position on his front, had decided that its weakest point was the west face of the salient (called the 'Mule Shoe' by Confederates) enclosing the McCoull house. The entrenchments here were strong and were supported by a partially completed second line. But the position was open to Union artillery. Also, there was a belt of timber, which would conceal Union troops forming for the attack, some 200 yards in front of the Confederate works. For this operation, Wright organized a special task force of twelve regiments under the command of Col. Emory Upton, who had led the attack that surprised Lee's bridgehead at Rappahannock Station the year before. Mott's division of the II Corps was to support.

Upton was a born soldier and a keen student of his profession. His plans for the assault were careful and detailed. All the regimental commanders were taken forward under cover to examine the ground and a heavy battery was emplaced to hammer the works until the charge began. Upton formed his troops in four lines of three regiments each: when the first line reached the Confederate works, it was to split right and left and widen the penetration; the second line was to carry the second Confederate position; the last two lines formed the reserve and were to halt and lie down just outside the Confederate breastworks until needed.

At 6:10 p.m., Upton charged. Confederate fire was heavy and accurate, but the yelling Union advance broke through, beating down determined Confederate opposition and capturing about 1,000 prisoners. Mott, however, had formed his men in the open; they were an unreliable lot and Confederate artillery fire soon scattered them. Upton was left isolated, with a large part of the Confederate army concentrating against him. To support him, Hancock renewed the attack on the Federal right, but was repulsed. Upton hung on until dark and withdrew. Meanwhile, Burnside placed the IX Corps near the Confederate right flank and entrenched.

There was no fighting on 11 May. Grant was sending his wagons to the rear for supplies and evacuating his wounded. At the same time, lacking cavalry, he sent an infantry brigade on reconnaissance to Todd's Tavern. This movement alarmed Lee, who suspected a repetition of Hancock's advance on the 9th, and so pushed out troops toward Shady Grove Church. Later reports that Federal trains were moving to the rear and that Union troops appeared to be shifting to the east seem to have convinced Lee that Grant was planning a major movement that night—probably a retreat to Fredericksburg. Consequently, he warned his subordinates to be ready to move on short notice. Visiting Ewell's sector, he noted that it would be difficult to remove the guns during the night, and told Ewell to withdraw them before dark. Lee was still convinced that the only chance for a Confederate victory lay in a successful battle. If Grant was there, Lee intended to strike him.

Grant was indeed carrying out a major movement. He had instructed Meade to organize a strong attack by the II and IX Corps on the Mule Shoe at 4:00 a.m., 12 May. The V and VI Corps were to be ready to exploit any successes gained by the main effort. This was to be a repetition of Upton's attack, but on a larger scale.

Hancock moved from his position on the right after dark in a steady rain, and began forming for the attack. Then a heavy fog set in, and it was 4:35 a.m. before it was light enough to advance. Hancock had massed his corps in heavy formations, to obtain

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better control in the dark and fog and to get the greatest possible number of men into the Confederate works in the first rush. He was, naturally, unaware that Lee had ordered most of the cannon withdrawn from the salient, and so expected heavy casualties until the Confederate batteries could be overrun.

In the Mule Shoe, the Confederate outposts heard sounds suggesting an attack. The absent artillery was hurriedly ordered to return, and troops were moved into line. For almost an hour, the shivering Confederates waited; the returning guns began to appear. Then, out of the lifting fog and dark, came a great cheer. Masses of Federals swamped the Mule Shoe, capturing its garrison and catching the returning guns in column on the road. They swept on until checked by an incomplete line of breastworks about halfway down the salient. Here, the capable Gordon was rapidly organizing a counterattack. Lee attempted to lead it personally, but—as in the Wilderness—was restrained by his men.

Hancock's dense formation now hampered the Union effort. The Confederate line had broken much more easily than had been expected; formations crowded together and became confused; control was difficult. Gordon's audacious counterattack, supported by part of Early's Corps (acting commander of Ewell's Corps), forced the Federals out of most of the Mule Shoe, but could not regain the original Confederate position. Even where driven out of the recently captured fortifications, the Federals clung to their outer edge. The fighting raged savagely throughout the day and into the night, especially at the so-called "Bloody Angle" where Wright—ordered forward by Meade when Hancock was stalled—struck the Confederate defenses. Later, Warren was ordered to attack, but was repulsed. Grant then proposed to shift him to Wright's support at the already crowded salient, but later revoked the order. Burnside's attack had some initial success, but was soon driven back. Early then attempted a counterattack against Burnside's left flank, but was checked at the outset.

While the two armies fought stubbornly, Lee was hastening the construction of a new line across the base of the Mule Shoe south of Harrison. Work was slow; not until after midnight were the Confederates in the salient ordered to disengage and fall back.

Both exhausted armies were relatively quite during 13 May. Grant considered the possibilities of the situation confronting him. Direct assaults on Lee's position had produced only limited gains at high cost. A movement against the Confederate left would threaten Lee's communications with his advance base at Louisa Court House and probably would result in a prompt Confederate withdrawal to a position behind the next natural line of defense—in this case, the North Anna River, fifteen miles south. However, the continued absence of Sheridan's cavalry left the Union army at a disadvantage for such an open war of maneuver, and might expose Grant's own communications to a Confederate counterstroke. Grant therefore decided to make his next effort against Lee's right flank, hoping to envelop it before Lee could shift troops from the Confederate left or extend his fortifications farther south from Spotsylvania Court House. (At this time, these fortifications extended only about a quarter of a mile south of the court house.)

Accordingly, Warren was ordered to move immediately after dark and form for an attack at 4:00 a.m., the 14th, down the road leading from Fredericksburg to Spotsylvania. Wright was to move out behind Warren, form across the next road to the south, and attack westward at the same time. Hancock and Burnside were both to be ready for

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

action at 4:00 a.m., but were not to advance until ordered to do so.

There were no roads for the V and VI Corps to follow. Instead, they had to move by night across country, much of which was wooded and cut by many small creeks. Guides were provided by Meade's headquarters, and Warren took great care to mark the route by a string of sentries and fires.

The weather that night favored the Confederates. Heavy rains and fog extinguished Warren's fires and blinded his columns as they struggled through knee-deep mud and underbrush. Every creek was an obstacle. Not until 6:00 a.m. did the head of the V Corps arrive at Fredericksburg Road; it took the rest of the day to collect and reorganize its exhausted men. The attack had to be called off.

Wright (Sedgwick's replacement) originally concentrated his VI Corps in a concealed position on the north bank of the Ny River—apparently in the hope of making an attack the next morning—but sent Upton's small brigade across the river to occupy a hill which commanded the fords his corps would have to use in such an offensive. Confederate cavalry—one of the units Stuart had left with Lee—discovered Upton's force, and Mahone's division of the III Corps was sent out to determine the extent of Federal activity in this area. Mahone forced Upton back, but was himself driven off by troops dispatched by Warren. Wright then moved his entire corps forward and occupied the position.

Confederate reaction had been comparatively slow, the complete withdrawal of the V Corps from the Federal right not being definitely established until the afternoon of the 14th. Lee thereupon began deliberately shifting troops from his left to his right flank and prolonging his entrenchments southward. Probably only the weather had saved him from surprise and serious trouble.

Grant had disappointments in addition to the one that the weather had just inflicted upon him at Spotsylvania. Two minor operations which he had intended to assist the advance of the Army of the Potomac had been complete failures. In the Shenandoah Valley, the patriotic but inept Sigel had managed to lose a battle at New Market where the cadets of the Virginia Military Institute formed part of the Confederate force. On the James River front, the energetic but incompetent Butler had brought on another fiasco. After failing to seize Petersburg in early May, when it was very weakly garrisoned, he had then delayed until Beauregard could scrape together enough troops to defeat him on 10 May at Drewry's Bluff. Now he was bottled up at Bermuda Hundred—the neck of land just north of Petersburg between the converging James and Appomattox Rivers—where his position was of little value. (Butler's appointment to this command had been forced on Lincoln by the hard facts that 1864 was an election year and that Butler was a leading Northern Democrat with a thirst for military glory.)

Grant could no longer hope that these operations would weaken Lee by forcing him to detach troops from his army in order to defend Richmond and Petersburg, or to hold the Shenandoah. Indeed, Lee himself now received reinforcements from the victorious Confederates in both of those areas. If the war was to be won in the east, the Army of the Potomac would have to win it alone.

During 14-17 May, the two armies improved their positions. Though there were no actual engagements of any size, the opposing troops were in close and constant contact. Continual skirmishing, sniping, and artillery fire produced steady losses. Grant pulled most of Hancock's II Corps out of line in order to rest it for his next offensive.

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Wright suggested that his corps might suddenly be shifted back to the right of the Union line for an attack on the Confederate left flank, which might have been weakened in order to provide troops to extend Lee's right flank to the Po River. Grant accepted and expanded the idea: Hancock and Wright were to shift their troops into the former Mule Shoe area for an assault at daylight on the 18th; Burnside was to attack in conjunction with them; Warren was to support the attack with his artillery and to stand ready to advance.

Apparently, Confederate scouts and patrols detected the movement. At any rate, no surprise was achieved: the advancing Federals found the Confederates ready and waiting. The Union attacks were made with gallantry and energy, but were rapidly shot to pieces by Confederate artillery; only a few cases did the attackers threaten the Confederate line. By about 10:00 a.m., even Grant was willing to halt the operation.

Following the repulse of the 18 May attack, Grant moved Wright back to his former position and again placed Hancock in reserve. During the night of the 18th, he shifted Burnside to his extreme left. Warren extended the right flank of his V Corps across the Ny River. Grant now formed a plan which, he hoped, would lure Lee out from behind his earthworks. Hancock was ordered to advance rapidly southward on the night of the 19th along the line of the Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad, five miles to the east. The rest of the army would remain in its present position, ready to follow after Hancock had gotten about twenty miles' head start. In this time, it was expected that Lee would attempt to overtake and destroy Hancock—thus giving Grant a chance to overwhelm the Confederates in the open before they could entrench. If Lee did not take the bait, the operation could be converted into another effort to envelop Lee's right flank.

Some indications of these shifts reached Lee, who knew that a rapid, undetected Federal advance south might cut in between his army and Richmond. Suspicious that this was Grant's intention, he ordered Ewell to advance on his front on the 19th and determine whether troops had been withdrawn from the Union right flank.

By now, Ewell's corps had been reduced to approximately 6,000 men. Ewell felt that this force was too weak to risk in front of the Federal fortifications and so secured Lee's permission to move around the Union flank. The country being deep in mud after a series of showers, he felt obliged to leave all his artillery behind, advancing with his infantry alone. About 3:00 p.m., he established contact with Federal units covering the Fredericksburg Road. These were mostly raw troops which had never been in action before and should have had little chance against Ewell's veterans. Nonetheless, they met Ewell headlong—if with more vigor than skill—and fought him to a standstill. Both Hancock and Warren sent reinforcements, and in the end Ewell was lucky to get away, thanks to Hampton's cavalry and horse artillery, which arrived in time to cover the retreat. However, he had discovered that the Union right flank was still strong, and—as a more positive result of his adventure—Grant was led to postpone Hancock's advance until the night of the 20th.

Union losses during the fighting around Spotsylvania Court House appear to have been between 17,000 and 18,000. Confederate casualties are unknown, but since their forces fought behind fortifications during most of these engagements, their losses must have been considerably less—possibly between 9,000 and 10,000.

APPENDIX II

Confederate Order of Battle for the Wilderness - May 5-6, 1864

The Army of Northern Virginia General Robert E. Lee

I Army Corps

Lt. Gen. James Longstreet

Kershaw's Division	Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw
Kershaw's Brigade	Col. John W. Henagan
2nd SC	Lt. Col. F. Gaillard
3rd SC	Col. James D. Nance
7th SC	Capt. James Mitchell
8th SC	Lt. Col. E. T. Stackhouse
15th SC	Col. John B. Davis
3rd SC Battalion	Capt. B. M. Whitener
Humphreys' Brigade	Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys
13th MS	Maj. G. L. Donald
17th MS	
18th MS	Capt. W. H. Lewis
21st MS	Col. D. N. Moody
Wofford's Brigade	Gen. William T. Wofford
16th GA	
18th GA	
24th GA	
Cobb's GA Legion	
Phillips GA Legion	
3rd GA Sharpshooters	
Bryan's Brigade	Brig. Gen. Goode Bryan
10th GA	Col. Willis C. Holt
50th GA	Col. P. McGlashan
51st GA	Col. E. Ball
53rd GA	Col. James P. Simms
Field's Division	Maj. Gen. Charles W. Field
Jenkins' Brigade	Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins
1st SC	Col. James R. Hagood

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

2nd SC (Rifles)	Col. R. E. Bowen
5th SC	Col. A. Coward
6th SC	Col. John Bratton
Palmetto Sharp.	Col. Joseph Walker
Anderson's Brigade	Gen. George T. Anderson
7th GA	
8th GA	
9th GA	
11th GA	
59th GA	Lt. Col. B. H. Gee
Law's Brigade	Brig. Gen. E. McIver Law
4th AL	Col. P. D. Bowles
15th AL	
44th AL	Col. W. F. Perry
47th AL	
48th AL	Lt. Col. W. M. Hardwick
Gregg's Brigade	Brig. Gen. Hohn Gregg
3rd AR	Col. Van H. Manning
1st TX	
4th TX	Col. J. P. Bane
5th TX	Lt. Col. K. Bryan
Benning's Brigade	Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning
2nd GA	
15th GA	Col. D. M. DuBose
17th GA	
20th GA	
Artillery	Gen. E. Porter Alexander
Huger's Battalion	Lt. Col. Frank Huger
Fickling's Battery VA	
Moody's Battery LA	
Parker's Battery VA	
J. D. Smith's Battery VA	
Taylor's Battery VA	
Woolfolk's Battery VA	
Haskell's Battalion	Maj. John C. Haskell
Flanner's Battery NC	
Garden's Battery SC	
Lamkin's Battery VA	
Ramsay's Battery NC	

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Cabell's Battalion	Col. Henry C. Cabell
Callaway's Battery GA	
Carlton's Battery GA	
McCarthy's Battery VA	
Manly's Battery NC	

II Army Corps

Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell

Early's Division	Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early
Hay's Brigade	Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays
5th LA	Lt. Col. Bruce Menger
6th LA	Maj. William H. Manning
7th LA	Maj. J. M. Wilson
8th LA	
9th LA	
Pegram's Brigade	Brig. Gen. John Pegram
13th VA	Col. JamesB. Terrill
31st VA	Col. John S.Hoffman
49th VA	Col. J. C. Gibson
52nd VA	
58th VA	
Gordon's Brigade	Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon
13th GA	
26th GA	Col. E. N. Atkinson
31st GA	Col. C. A. Evans
38th GA	
60th GA	Lt. Col. Thomas J. Berry
61st GA	
Johnson's Division	Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson
Stonewall Brigade	Brig. Gen. James A. Walker
2nd VA	Capt. C. H. Stewart
4th VA	Col. William Terry
5th VA	
27th VA	Lt. Col. Charles L. Haynes
33rd VA	
Steuart's Brigade	Gen. George H. Steuart
1st NC	Col. H. A. Brown

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

3rd NC	Col. S. D. Thruston
10th VA	
23rd VA	
37th VA	
Jone's Brigade	Brig. Gen. John M. Jones
21st VA	
25th VA	Col. J. C. Higginbotham
42nd VA	
44th VA	
48th VA	
50th VA	
Stafford's Brigade	Gen. Leroy A. Stafford
1st LA	
2nd LA	Col. J. M. Williams
10th LA	
14th LA	
15th LA	
Rode's Division	Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes
Daniel's Brigade	Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel
32nd NC	
43rd NC	
45th NC	
53rd NC	
2nd NC Battery	
Ramseur's Brigade	Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur
2nd NC	Col. W. R. Cox
4th NC	Col. Bryan Grimes
14th NC	Col. R. T. Bennett
30th NC	Col. F. M. Parker
Doles' Brigade	Brig. Gen. George Doles
4th GA	
12th GA	Col. Edward Willis
44th GA	Col. W. H. Peebles
Battle's Brigade	Brig. Gen. Cullen A. Battle
3rd AL	Col. Charles Forsyth
5th AL	
6th AL	
12th AL	
26th AL	

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Johnston's Brigade	Gen. Robert D. Johnston
5th NC	Col. T. M. Garrett
12th NC	Col. H. E. Collman
20th NC	Col. Thomas F. Toon
23rd NC	

Artillery	Gen. Armistead L. Long
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Hardaway's Battalion	Lt. Col. R. A. Hardaway
Dance's Battery VA	
Graham's Battery VA	
C. B. Griffin's Battery VA	
Jones' Battery VA	
B. H. Smith's Battery VA	

Nelson's Battalion	Lt. Col. William Nelson
Kirkpatrick's Battery VA	
Massie's Battery VA	
Milledge's Battery GA	

Braxton's Battalion	Lt. Col. Carter M. Braxton
Carpenter's Battery VA	
Cooper's Battery VA	
Hardwicke's Battery VA	

Cutshaw's Battalion	Maj. W. E. Cutshaw
Carrington's Battery VA	
A. W. Garber's Battery VA	
Tanner's Battery VA	

Page's Battalion	Maj. R. C. M. Page
W. P. Carter's Battery VA	
Fry's Battery VA	
Page's Battery VA	
Reese's Battery AL	

III Army Corps

Lt. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill

Anderson's Division	Gen. Richard H. Anderson
Perrin's Brigade	Brig. Gen. Abner Perrin
8th AL	
9th AL	

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

10th AL
11th AL
14th AL

Mahone's Brigade	Brig. Gen. William Mahone
6th VA	Lt. Col. H. W. Williamson
12th VA	Col. D. A. Weisiger
16th VA	Lt. Col. R. O. Whitehead
41st VA	
61st VA	Col. V. D. Groner

Harris' Brigade	Gen. Nathaniel H. Harris
12th MS	
16th MS	Col. S. E. Baker
19th MS	Col. T. J. Hardin
48th MS	

Wright's Brigade	Gen. Ambrose R. Wright
3rd GA	
22nd GA	
48th GA	
2nd GA Battalion	Maj. C. J. Moffett

Perry's Brigade	Brig. Gen. E. A. Perry
2nd FL	
5th FL	
8th FL	

Heth's Division	Maj. Gen. Henry Heth
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Davis' Brigade	Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis
2nd MS	
11th MS	
42nd MS	
55th NC	

Cooke's Brigade	Brig. Gen. John R. Cook
15th NC	
27th NC	
46th NC	
48th NC	

Kirkland's Brigade	Gen. William W. Kirkland
11th NC	
26th NC	
44th NC	

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

47th NC	
52nd NC	
Walker's Brigade	Brig. Gen. Henry H. Walker
40th VA	
47th VA	Col. R. M. Mayo
55th VA	Col. W. S. Christian
22nd VA Battalion	
Archer's Brigade	Brig. Gen. James J. Archer
1st TN	Maj. F. G. Buchanan
7th TN	Lt. Col. S. G. Shepard
14th TN	Col. William McComb
Wilcox's Division	Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox
Lane's Brigade	Brig. Gen. James H. Lane
7th NC	Lt. Col. W. Lee Davidson
18th NC	Col. John D. Barry
28th NC	
33rd NC	Lt. Col. R. V. Cowan
37th NC	Col. William M. Barbour
Scale's Brigade	Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Scales
13th NC	Col. J. H. Hyman
16th NC	Col. W. A. Stowe
22nd NC	
34th NC	Col. W. L. J. Lowrance
38th NC	Lt. Col. John Ashford
McGowan's Brigade	Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan
1st SC	Lt. Col. W. P. Shooter
12th SC	Col. John L. Miller
13th SC	Col. B. T. Brockman
14th SC	Col. Joseph N. Brown
1st SC Rifles	Lt. Col. G. McD. Miller
Thomas' Brigade	Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas
14th GA	
35th GA	
45th GA	
49th GA	Lt. Col. J. T. Jordan
Artillery	Col. R. Lindsay Walker
Poague's Battalion	Lt. Col. William T. Poague

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Richard's Battery MS
Utterback's Battery VA
Williams' Battery NC
Wyatt's Battery VA

McIntosh's Battalion Lt. Col. D. G. McIntosh
Clutter's Battery VA
Donald's Battery VA
Hurt's Battery AL
Price's Battery VA

Pegram's Battalion Lt. Col. W. J. Pegram
Brander's Battery VA
Cayce's Battery VA
Ellett's Battery VA
Marye's Battery VA
Zimmerman's Battery SC

Cutts' Battalion Col. A. S. Cutts
Patterson's Battery GA
Ross' Battery GA
Wingfield's Battery GA

Richardson's Battalion Lt. Col. Charles Richardson
Grandy's Battery VA
Landry's Battery LA
Moore's Battery VA
Penick's Battery VA

Cavalry Corps

Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart

Hampton's Division Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton

Young's Brigade Brig. Gen. P. M. B. Young
7th GA Col. W. P. White
Cobb's Legion GA Col. G. J. Wright
Phillips Legion GA
20th GA Lt. Col. John M. Millen
Jeff Davis Legion MS

Rosser's Brigade Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser
7th VA Col. R. H. Dulany
11th VA
12th VA Lt. Col. Thomas B. Massie
35th VA Battalion

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Butler's Brigade	Brig. Gen. M. C. Butler
4th SC	Col. B. H. Rutledge
5th SC	Col. John Dunovant
6th SC	Col. Hugh K. Aiken
Fitz Lee's Division	Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee
Lomax's Brigade	Gen. Lunsford L. Lomax
5th VA	Col. Henry C. Pateh
6th VA	
15th VA	
Wickham's Brigade	Gen. William C. Wickham
1st VA	
2nd VA	Col. Thomas T. Munford
3rd VA	Col. Thomas H. Owen
4th VA	
W. H. F. Lee's Division	Maj. W. H. F. Lee
Chambliss' Brigade	Gen. John R. Chambliss Jr.
9th VA	
10th VA	
13th VA	
Gordon's Brigade	Brig. Gen. James B. Gordon
1st NC	
2nd NC	Col. C. M. Andrews
5th NC	Col. S. B. Evans
Horse Artillery	Maj. R. P. Chew
Breathed's Battalion	Maj. James Breathed
Hart's Battery SC	
Johnston's Battery VA	
McGregor's Battery VA	
Shoemaker's Battery VA	
Thompson's Battery VA	

**The effective strength of the above forces
was at least 61,000 men.**

APPENDIX III

Union Order of Battle for the Wilderness - May 5-6, 1864

The Union Army

Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant

Escort

5th US Cavalry (B, F & K) Capt. Julius W. Mason

The Army of the Potomac

Major General George C. Meade

Provost Guard

1st MA Cavalry (C & D)
80th NY Infantry
3rd PA Cavalry
68th PA Infantry
114th PA Infantry

Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick
Capt. Edward A. Flint
Col. Theodore B. Gates
Maj. James W. Walsh
Lt. Col. Robert E. Winslow
Col. Charles H. T. Collis

Volunteer Engineer Brigade

15th NY Engineers
50th NY Engineers

Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham
Maj. William A. Ketchum
Lt. Col. Ira Spaulding

Battalion U.S. Engineers

Capt. George H. Mendel

Guards and Orderlies

Oneida, NY Cavalry

Capt. Daniel P. Mann

Second Army Corps

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock

Escort

1st VT Cavalry(M)

Capt. John H. Hazelton

First Division

Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow

First Brigade

26th MI
61st NY
81st PA
140th PA
183rd PA

Col. Nelson A. Miles
Maj. Lemuel Saviers
Lt. Col. K. O. Broady
Col. H. Boyd McKeen
Col. John Fraser
Col. George P. McLean

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Second Brigade	Col. Thomas A. Smyth
28th MA	Lt. Col. George W. Cartright
63rd NY	Maj. Thomas Touhy
69th NY	Capt. Richard Moroney
88th NY	Capt. Denis F. Burke
116th PA	Lt. Col. Richard C. Dale
Third Brigade	Col. Paul Frank
39th NY	Col. Augustus Funk
52nd NY	Maj. Henry M. Karples
57th NY	Lt. Col. Alford B. Chapman
111th NY	Capt. Aaron P. Seeley
125th NY	Lt. Col. Aarn B. Myer
126th NY	Capt. Winfield Scott
Fourth Brigade	Col. John R. Brooke
2nd DE	Col. William P. Bailey
64th NY	Maj. Lemen W. Bradley
66th NY	Lt. Col. John S. Hammell
53rd PA	Lt. Col. Richards McMichael
145th PA	Col. Hiram L. Brown
148th PA	Col. James A. Beaver
Second Division	Brig. Gen. John Gibbon
Provost Guard	
2nd Co. MN Sharp.	Capt. Mahlon Black
First Brigade	Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Webb
19th ME	Col. Selden Connor
Andrew, MA Sharp.	Lt. Samuel G. Gilbreth
15th MA	Maj. I. Harris Hooper
19th MA	Maj. Edmund Rice
20th MA	Maj. Henry L. Abbott
7th MI	Maj. Silvanus W. Curtis
42nd NY	Maj. Patrick J. Downing
59th NY	Capt. William McFadden
82nd NY	Col. Henry W. Hudson
Second Brigade	Brig. Gen. Joshua T. Owen
152nd NY	Lt. Col. George W. Thompson
69th PA	Maj. William Davis
71st PA	Lt. Col. Cha. Kochersperger
72nd PA	Col. De Witt C. Baxter
106th PA	Capt. Robert H. Ford

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

26th PA	Maj. Samuel G. Moffett
115th PA	Maj. William A. Reilly
Second Brigade	Col. William R. Brewster
11th MA	Col. William Blaisdell
70th NY	Maj. William H. Hugo
71st NY	Lt. Col. Thomas Rafferty
72nd NY	Lt. Col. John Leonard
73rd NY	Lt. Col. Michael W. Burns
74th NY	Lt. Col. Thomas Holt
120th NY	Capt. Abram L. Lockwood
84th PA	Lt. Col. Milton Opp
Artillery Brigade	Col. John C. Tidball
6th ME	Capt. Edwin B. Dow
10th MA	Capt. J. Henry Sleeper
1st NH	Capt. Fred. M. Edgell
1st NY (Co G)	Capt. Nelson Ames
4th NY Heavy	Lt. Col. Thomas R. Allcock
1st PA (Co F)	Capt. R. Bruce Ricketts
1st RI (Co A)	Capt. William A. Arnold
1st RI (Co B)	Capt. T. Fred Brown
4th US (Co K)	Lt. John W. Roder
5th US (Cos C, I)	Lt. James Gilliss

Fifth Army Corps

Maj. Gen. G. K. Warren

Provost Guard
12th NY

Maj. Henry W. Rider

First Division

Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin

First Brigade
140th NY
146th NY
91st PA
155th PA
2nd US
11th US
12th US
14th US
17th US

Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres
Col. George Ryan
Col. David T. Jenkins
Lt. Col. Joseph H. Sinex
Lt. Col. Alfred L. Pearson
Capt. James W. Long
Capt. Francis M. Cooley
Maj. Luther G. Gruen
Capt. E. McK. Hudson
Capt. James F. Grimes

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Second Brigade	Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer
9th MA	Col. Patrick R. Guiney
22nd MA	Col. William S. Tilton
32nd MA	Col. George L. Prescott
4th MI	Lt. Col. George W. Lumbard
62nd PA	Lt. Col. James C. Hull

Third Brigade	Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett
20th ME	Maj. Ellis Spear
18th MA	Col. Joseph Hayes
1st MI	Lt. Col. William A. Throop
16th MI	Maj. Robert T. Elliott
44th NY	Lt. Col. Freeman Connor
83rd PA	Col. O. S. Woodward
118th PA	Col. James Gwyn

Second Division	Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson
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First Brigade	Col. Samuel H. Leonard
16th ME	Col. Charles W. Tilden
13th MA	Capt. Charles H. Hovey
39th MA	Col. Phineas S. Davis
104th NY	Col. Gilbert G. Prey

Second Brigade	Brig. Gen. Henry Baxter
12th MA	Col. James L. Bates
83rd NY	Col. Joseph A. Moesch
97th NY	Col. Charles Wheelock
11th PA	Col. Richard Coulter
88th PA	Capt. George B. Rhoads
90th PA	Col. Peter Lyle

Third Brigade	Col. Andrew W. Denison
1st MD	Maj. Benjamin H. Schley
4th MD	Col. Richard N. Bowerman
7th MD	Col. Charles E. Phelps
8th MD	Lt. Col. Hohn G. Johannes

Third Division	Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford
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First Brigade	Col. William McCandless
1st PA	Col. William C. Talley
2nd PA	Maj. LeGrand B. Speece
11th PA	Col. Samuel M. Jackson
13th PA	Maj. W. R. Hartshorn

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Third Brigade	Col. Joseph W. Fisher
5th PA	Lt. Col. George Dare
8th PA	Col. Silas M. Baily
10th PA	Lt. Col. Ira Ayer Jr.
12th PA	Lt. Col. Richard Gustin
Fourth Division	Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth
First Brigade	Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler
7th IN	Col. Ira G. Grover
19th IN	Col. Samuel J. Williams
24th MI	Col. Henry A. Morrow
1st NY Sharp.	Capt. Volney J. Shipman
2nd WI	Lt. Col. John Mansfield
6th WI	Col. Edward S. Bragg
7th WI	Col. William W. Robinson
Second Brigade	Brig. Gen. James C. Rice
76th NY	Lt. Col. John E. Cook
84th NY	Col. Edward B. Fowler
95th NY	Col. Edward Pye
147th NY	Col. Francis C. Miller
56th PA	Col. J. William Hofmann
Third Brigade	Col. Roy Stone
121st PA	Capt. Samuel T. Lloyd
142nd PA	Maj. Horatio N. Warren
143rd PA	Col. Edmund L. Dana
149th PA	Lt. Col. John Irvin
150th PA	Capt. George W. Jones
Artillery Brigade	Col. Charles S. Wainwright
3rd MA	Capt. Augustus P. Martin
5th MA	Capt. Charles A. Phillips
1st NY (Co D)	Capt. George B. Winslow
1st NY (Cos E, L)	Lt. George Breck
1st NY	Capt. Charles E. Mink
4th NY Heavy	Maj. William Arthur
1st PA (Co B)	Capt. James H. Cooper
4th US (Co B)	Lt. James Stewart
5th US (Co D)	Lt. B. F. Rittenhouse

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Sixth Corps

Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick

Escort

8th PA Cavalry (Co A) Capt. Charles E. Fellows

First Division

Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright

First Brigade

Col. Henry W. Brown

1st NJ

Lt. Col. William Henry, Jr.

2nd NJ

Lt. Col. Charles Wiebecke

3rd NJ

Capt. Samuel T. DuBois

4th NJ

Lt. Col. Charles Ewing

101st NJ

Col. Henry O. Ryerson

15th NJ

Col. William H. Penrose

Second Brigade

Col. Emory Upton

5th ME

Col. Clark S. Edwards

121st NY

Lt. Col. Egbert Olcott

95th PA

Lt. Col. Edward Carroll

96th PA

Lt. Col. William H. Lessig

Third Brigade

Brig. Gen. David A. Russell

6th ME

Maj. George Fuller

49th PA

Col. Thomas M. Hulings

119th PA

Maj. enry P. Truefitt, Jr.

5th WI

Lt. Col. Theodore B. Catlin

Fourth Brigade

Brig. Gen. Alexander Shaler

65th NY

Col. Joseph E. Hamblin

67th NY

Col. Nelson Cross

122nd NY

Lt. Col. Augustus W. Dwight

Second Division

Brig. Gen. George W. Getty

First Brigade

Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton

62nd NY

Col. David J. Nevin

93rd PA

Lt. Col. John S. Long

98th PA

Col. John F. Ballier

102nd PA

Col. John W. Patterson

139th PA

Lt. Col. William H. Moody

Second Brigade

Col. Lewis A. Grant

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

2nd VT	Col. Newton Stone
3rd VT	Col. Thomas O. Seaver
4th VT	Col. George P. Foster
5th VT	Lt. Col. John R. Lewis
6th VT	Col. Elisha L. Barney
Third Brigade	Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Neill
7th ME	Col. Edwin C. Mason
43rd NY	Lt. Col. Jon Wilson
49th NY	Col. Daniel D. Bidwell
77th NY	Maj. Nathan S. Babcock
61st PA	Col. George F. Smith
Fourth Brigade	Brig. Gen. Henry L. Eustis
7th MA	Col. Thomas D. Johns
10th MA	Lt. Col. Joseph B. Parsons
37th MA	Col. Oliver Edwards
2nd RI	Lt. Col. S. B. M. Read
Third Division	Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts
First Brigade	Brig. Gen. William H. Morris
14th NJ	Lt. Col. Caldwell K. Hall
106th NY	Lt. Col. Charles Townsend
151st NY	Lt. Col. Thomas M. Fay
87th PA	Col. John W. Schall
10th VT	Lt. Col. William W. Henry
Second Brigade	Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour
6th MD	Col. John W. Horn
110th OH	Col. J. Warren Keifer
122nd OH	Col. William H. Ball
126th OH	Col. Benjamin F. Smith
67th PA (detached)	Capt. George W. Guss
138th PA	Col. Matthew R. McClennan
Artillery Brigade	Col. Charles H. Tompkins
4th ME	Lt. Melville C. Kimball
1st MA	Capt. William H. McCartney
1st NY	Capt. Andrew Cowan
3rd NY	Capt. William A. Harn
4th NY Heavy	Maj. Thomas D. Sears
1st RI (Co C)	Capt. Richard Waterman
1st RI (Co E)	Capt. William B. Rhodes
1st RI (Co G)	Capt. George W. Adams

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

5th US (Co M)

Capt. James McKnight

Ninth Army Corps

Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside

Provost Guard
8th US

Capt. Milton Cogswell

First Division
Stevenson

Brig. Gen. Thomas G.

First Brigade
35th MA
56th MA
57th MA
59th MA
4th US
10th US

Col. Sumner Carruth
Maj. Nathaniel Wales
Col. Charles E. Griswold
Col. William F. Bartlett
Col. J. Parker Gould
Capt. Charles H. Brightly
Maj. Samuel B. Hayman

Second Brigade
3rd MD
21st MA
100th PA

Col. Daniel Leasure
Col. Joseph M. Sudsburg
Lt. Col. George P. Hawkes
Lt. Col. Matthew M. Dawson

Artillery
2nd ME
14th MA

Capt. Albert F. Thomas
Capt. J. W. B. Wright

Second Division

Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter

First Brigade
36th MA
58th MA
51st NY
45th PA
48th PA
7th RI

Col. Zenas R. Bliss
Maj. William F. Draper
Lt. Col. John C. Whiton
Col. Charles W. Le Gendre
Col. John I. Curtin
Lt. Col. Henry Pleasants
Capt. Theodore Winn

Second Brigade
31st ME
32nd ME
6th NH
9th NH
11th NH

Col. Simon G. Griffin
Lt. Col. Thomas Hight
Maj. Arthur Deering
Lt. Col. Henry H. Pearson
Lt. Col. John W. Babbitt
Col. Walter Harriman

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

17th VT	Lt. Col. Charles Cummings
Artillery	
11th MA	Capt. Edward J. Jones
19th NY	Capt. Edward W. Rogers
Third Division	
Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox	
First Brigade	
2nd MI	Col. John F. Hartranft
8th MI	Col. William Humphrey
17th MI	Col. Frank Graves
27th MI	Col. Constan Luce
109th NY	Maj. Samuel Moody
51st PA	Col. Benjamin F. Tracy
	Lt. Col. Edwin Schall
Second Brigade	
1st MI Sharp.	Col. Benjamin C. Christ
20th MI	Col. Charles V. DeLand
79th NY	Lt. Col. Byron M. Cutcheon
60th OH	Col. David Morrison
50th PA	Lt. Col. James N. McElroy
	Lt. Col. Edward Overton Jr.
Artillery	
7th ME	Capt. Adelbert B. Twitchell
34th NY	Capt. Jacob Roemer
Fourth Division	
Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero	
First Brigade	
27th US	Col. Joshua K. Sigfried
30th US	Lt. Col. Charles J. Wright
39th US	Col. Delavan Bates
43rd US	Col. Ozora P. Stearns
	Lt. Col. H. Seymour Hall
Second Brigade	
30th CT	Col. Henry G. Thomas
19th US	Capt. Charles Robinson
23rd US	Lt. Col. Joseph Perkins
	Lt. Col. C. J. Campbell
Artillery	
D PA	Capt. George W. Durell
3rd VT	Capt. Romeo H. Start

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Cavalry	
3rd NJ	Col. Andrew J. Morrison
22nd NY	Col. Samuel J. Crooks
2nd OH	Lt. Col. George A. Purlington
13th PA	Maj. Michael Kerwin
Reserve Artillery	
27th NY	Capt. John Edwards Jr.
1st RI (Co D)	Capt. John B. Eaton
1st RI (Co H)	Capt. William W. Buckley
2nd US (Co E)	Capt. Crawford Allen Jr.
3rd US (Co G)	Lt. James S. Dudley
3rd US (Cos L & M)	Lt. Edmund Pendleton
	Lt. Erskine Gittings
Provisional Brigade	
24th NY Cavalry	Col. Elisha G. Marshall
14th NY Heavy Artil.	Col. William C. Raulston
2nd PA Heavy Artil.	Lt. Col. Clarence H. Corning
	Col. Thomas Wilhelm

Cavalry Corps

Maj. Gen. Phillip H. Sheridan

Escort	
6th US	Capt. Ira W. Claflin
First Division	
	Brig. Gen. A. T. A. Torbert
First Brigade	
1st MI	Brig. Gen. George A. Custer
5th MI	Lt. Col. Peter Stagg
6th MI	Col. Russell A. Alger
7th MI	Maj. James H. Kidd
	Maj. Henry W. Granger
Second Brigade	
4th NY	Col. Thomas C. Devin
6th NY	Lt. Col. William R. Parnell
9th NY	Lt. Col. William H. Crocker
17th PA	Col. William Sackett
	Lt. Col. James Q. Anderson
Reserve Brigade	
19th NY	Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt
6th PA	Col. Alfred Gibbs
	Maj. James Starr

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

1st US	Maj. Nelson B. Sweitzer
2nd US	Capt. T. F. Rodenbough
5th US	Capt. Abraham K. Arnold
Second Division	Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg
First Brigade	Bg. Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr
1st MA	Maj. Lucius M. Sargent
1st NJ	Lt. Col. John W. Kester
6th OH	Col. William Stedman
1st PA	Col. John P. Taylor
Second Brigade	Col. J. Irvin Gregg
1st ME	Col. Charles H. Smith
10th NY	Maj. M. Henry Avery
2nd PA	Lt. Col. Joseph P. Brinton
4th PA	Lt. Col. George H. Covode
8th PA	Lt. Col. Samuel Wilson
16th PA	Lt. Col. John K. Robinson
Third Division	Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson
Escort	
8th IL	Lt. William W. Long
First Brigade	Col. Timothy M. Bryan Jr.
1st CT	Maj. Erastus Blakeslee
2nd NY	Col. Otto Harhaus
5th NY	Lt. Col. John Hammond
18th PA	Lt. Col. William P. Brinton
Second Brigade	Col. George H. Chapman
3rd IN	Maj. William Patton
8th NY	Lt. Col. William H. Benjamin
1st VT	Lt. Col. Addison W. Preston
Artillery	Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt
Artillery Reserve	Col. Henry S. Burton
First Brigade	Col. J. Howard Kitching
6th NY Heavy	Lt. Col. Edmund R. Travis
15th NY Heavy	Col. Louis Schirmer

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Second Brigade	Maj. John A. Tompkins
5th ME	Capt. Greenleaf T. Stevens
1st NJ	Capt. William Hexamer
2nd NJ	Capt. A. Judson Clark
5th NY	Capt. Elijah D. Taft
12th NY	Capt. George F. McKnight
1st NY (Co B)	Capt. Albert S. Sheldon

Third Brigade	Maj. Robert H. Fitzhugh
9th MA	Capt. John Bigelow
15th NY	Capt. Patrick Hart
1st NY (Co C)	Lt. William H. Phillips
11th NY	Capt. John E. Burton
1st OH (Co H)	Lt. William A. Ewing
5th US (Co E)	Lt. John R. Brinckle

Horse Artillery

First Brigade	Capt. James M. Robertson
6th NY	Capt. Joseph W. Martin
2nd US (Cos B & L)	Lt. Edward Heaton
2nd US (Co D)	Lt. Edward B. Williston
2nd US (Co M)	Lt. A. C. M. Pennington
4th US (Co A)	Lt. Rufus King Jr.
4th US (Cos C & E)	Lt. Charles L. Fitzhugh

Second Brigade	Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom
1st US (Cos E & G)	Lt. Frank S. French
1st US (Cos H & I)	Capt. Alanson M. Randol
1st US (Co K)	Lt. John Egan
2nd US (Co A)	Lt. Robert Clark
2nd US (Co G)	Lt. William N. Dennison
3rd US (Cos C, F & K)	Lt. James R. Kelly

* Technically, the 9th Corps under Burnside reported directly to Grant during this engagement because Burnside had more seniority than Meade.

The effective strength of all the above forces was estimated at 118,000 men.

APPENDIX IV

LOGISTICAL SYSTEM IN THE UNION ARMY -1864

Bureau chiefs and heads of staff departments were responsible for various aspects of the Army's administration and logistics and reported directly to the Secretary of War. The division of responsibility and authority over them among the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretaries, and the General in Chief was never spelled out, and the supply departments functioned independently and without effective coordination throughout most of the Civil War, although much improved after Grant took command.

Logistical support was entrusted to the heads of four supply departments in Washington: the Quartermaster General, responsible for clothing and equipment, forage, animals, transportation, and housing; the Commissary General for rations; the Chief of Ordnance for weapons, ammunition, and miscellaneous related equipment; and the Surgeon General for medical supplies, evacuation, treatment, and hospitalization of the wounded.

For other support there were the Adjutant General, the Inspector General, the Paymaster General, the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Engineers, and the Chief of Topographical Engineers.

The military department was the basic organizational unit for administrative and logistical purposes, and the commander of each department controlled the support in that area with no intervening level between his departmental headquarters and the bureau chiefs in Washington. There were six departments when the war started (East, West, Texas, New Mexico, Utah, and Pacific); however, later on, boundaries changed and several geographical departments might be grouped together as a military-headquarters.

Army depots were located in major cities: Boston, New York, Baltimore, Washington, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, Chicago, New Orleans, and San Francisco. Philadelphia was the chief depot and manufacturing center for clothing. Advanced and temporary supply bases were established as needed to support active operations. Until 1864 most depots were authorized the rank of captain as commander, who despite their relatively low rank and meager pay, had tremendous resources of men, money, and material under their control. There were a few exceptions, notably Col. Daniel H. Rucker at the Washington Quarter Master Depot and Col. George D. Ramsay at the Washington Arsenal. The primary function of the depots was to procure supplies and prepare them for use in the field by repacking, assembling, or other similar tasks.

Procurement was decentralized. Purchases were made on the market by low-bid contract in the major cities and producing areas by depot officers. Flour and some other commodities were procured closer to the troops when possible. Cattle were contracted for at specific points, and major beef depots were maintained at Washington (on the grounds of the unfinished Washington Monument), Alexandria, VA, and Louisville. The Commissary Department developed a highly effective system of moving cattle on the hoof to the immediate rear of the armies in the field, to be slaughtered by brigade butchers and issued to the troops the day before consumption.

The Battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania

Resupply

The Army of the Potomac's supply train was huge, numbering over 4,000 wagons. Initially, the Army's line of communications was along wagon roads back to Brandy Station and thence by railroad to Washington. As soon as the Army crossed to the south bank of the Rapidan, Grant changed his base to Fredericksburg and established a forward supply base at Belle Plain, a tiny Potomac river hamlet

Belle Plain Supply Base

This sleepy backwater, the closest spot on the Potomac to the battlefield, was an 8-hour trip for barges and boats ferrying supplies from the depots at Washington and Alexandria. From Belle Plain flowed wagons hauling cargoes of rations, forage, and ammunition to Fredericksburg, 13 miles away and on to the front. Rearward through Belle Plain flowed the casualties of war: wounded men and prisoners by the thousands. To unload the incoming vessels, the US Military Railroads Construction Corps completed two pontoon-supported wharves which jutted out 360 feet into the Potomac River. Each wharf consisted of twin docks constructed in a U shape to allow supply wagons to drive out one pier, load up and drive off the other - and thence to Fredericksburg. Artillery, cavalry, and infantry reinforcements as well as supplies poured through Belle Plain to Grant's Army.

Over 3,000 rear echelon personnel kept Belle Plain operating - mostly engineers and members of the quartermaster and commissary department.

About 7,500 Confederate prisoners passed through Belle Plain between May 13 and May 18. They were guarded in a series of ravines, collectively dubbed the Punch Bowl, before being shipped to prison at Point Lookout, MD, at the mouth of the Potomac. On May 24th all traffic to Belle Plain abruptly ceased. The facility was closed after Grant had side-slipped around Lee's Spotsylvania defenses, and a new supply base was established farther south at Port Royal on the Rappahannock River.

The former river port facility can be reached by driving to the eastern terminus of State Route 604, also known Belle Plains (*sic*) Road. The original site is located three quarters of a mile to the east of the point designated as "Belle Plains" on modern maps, with the upper wharf situated on what is today known as Whipsawsons Point and the lower wharf at Pratt's Point. The area is heavily wooded and relatively undeveloped and no present day evidence remains of this important supply base, which was critical to the Union Army's success at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania.

APPENDIX V

LOGISTICAL SYSTEM IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY -1864

The Confederate Army used a similar system as the Union Army with depots at Richmond, Staunton, Raleigh, Atlanta, Columbus (GA), Huntsville, Montgomery, Jackson (MS), Little Rock, Alexandria (LA), and San Antonio. However, the Confederates were continually plagued by a lack of funds which collapsed domestic and overseas procurement, a shortage of animals and wagons for field transportation, and the failure of railroads to run on anything resembling a schedule. Supply Operations. Most unit logistics were accomplished at regimental level. The regimental Quarter Master was normally a line lieutenant designated by the regimental commander. His duties included submitting requisitions for all Quarter Master supplies and transport; accounting for regimental property including tentage, camp equipment, extra clothing, wagons, forage, and animals; issuing supplies; and managing the regimental trains. The regimental commissary officer, also designated from the line, requisitioned, accounted for, and issued rations. The regimental ordnance officer had similar duties regarding arms and ammunition and managed the movement of the unit ammunition train.

In theory, logistical staff positions above the regiment were filled by fully qualified officers of the supply department concerned. However, experienced officers were in perpetual short supply, and many authorized positions were filled by officers and noncommissioned officers from line units or left vacant, the duties performed by someone in addition to their own. This problem existed in both armies, where inexperience and ignorance of logistical principles and procedures generally reduced levels of support