



AMERICA'S ARMY:
THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)



- Overview
 - Background
 - Objectives
 - Signatories
 - Major Provisions

- Implementation and Compliance (I&C)
 - U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT)
 - Army Organization for New START I&C
 - Semi-Annual Data Exchange Information Flow

- Current Issues
 - Use of New START-accountable assets for Payload Launch Vehicles (PLVs) and Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs)
 - Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)
 - Missile Defense Interceptors



- Negotiations
 - START negotiations carried out between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R from 1982 to 1991
 - START entered into force on 5 December 1994 and expired on 5 December 2009
 - New START negotiations with Russia began in April 2009

- New START Signature and Ratification
 - New START was signed on 8 April 2010 in Prague, Czech Republic
 - Debate over Senate ratification began in the summer of 2010, with ratification expected in the fall 2010





- Demonstrate U.S. and Russian commitment to their obligation under Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
- Create “impetus” for future multilateral nuclear negotiations
- Reduce strategic offensive arms below levels outlined in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT)
 - Upon New START entry into force, SORT will expire
- Strengthen strategic stability and security



- Requires reductions in deployed strategic offensive arms over a seven year period from entry into force
- Valid for ten years after entry into force
 - One five-year extension allowed

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS	New START OBJECTIVES
TOTAL DEPLOYED WARHEADS	1550
TOTAL NUMBER OF DEPLOYED DELIVERY VEHICLES (i.e. Bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMS)	700
DEPLOYED AND NON DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS	800



- Regulates testing and modernization
- Requires notifications regarding New START-accountable strategic offensive arms (i.e. warheads, delivery vehicles, and launchers)
 - Exchange data on numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of weapons systems and facilities that are subject to New START
 - Provide regular notifications
 - Semi-annual updates
 - Unique identification numbers
- Establishes an on-site verification regime to help ensure compliance, in addition to:
 - National Technical Means (NTMs)
 - Telemetry
- Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)
 - Meet at least twice a year in Geneva, Switzerland
 - Provide oversight and serve as forum for dispute resolution



- New START allows 18 On-Site Inspections (OSIs) a calendar year
 - 10 Type One Inspections at ICBM, SLBM, and Bomber bases
 - 8 Type Two Inspections at storage, loading, production, conversion, elimination, or formerly declared facilities
 - Single facility cannot be inspected more than twice a year
 - Inspections to begin 60-days after entry into force

- New START has eliminated the former provisions for a Special Access Visit (SAV)
 - Facilities not listed in the START MOA were still subject to a potential SAV
 - Government and civilian contractor facilities were eligible for a SAV and were required to develop and staff contingency plans



- Camp Navajo is the Army's only inspectable facility
 - Located near Flagstaff, Arizona
 - Stores excess Air Force Minuteman ICBM motors
 - Plans underway to establish a New START-accountable SLBM storage area at Camp Navajo
 - Would store excess Trident D5 SLBMs




- Besides OSIs, other major elements of verification include the following:
 - National Technical Means (NTMs)
 - Explicit provisions that prohibit interference with NTM and the use of concealment measures that may impede monitoring
 - Telemetry collected on the booster of launches of existing types of SLBMs and ICBMs
 - Exchange on a maximum of five flights a year
 - Party conducting launch makes the determination if telemetry will be encrypted or exchanged
 - Telemetry collected from booster payloads will not be exchanged
 - New START establishes the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) as a compliance and implementation body that will meet at least twice each year, unless otherwise agreed
 - Compliance or implementation questions may be raised by either Party in the BCC




- Headquarters, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command (HQ, USASMDC/ARSTRAT)
 - Assists ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, agencies and activities in preparing for all Army New START on-site inspections
 - Ensures Army programs get compliance certification from the Department of Defense (DoD) New START Compliance Review Group
 - Submits semi-annual data exchanges to G-35 (DAMO-SSD), who submits data to Joint Chiefs of Staff



Notional Semi-Annual Data Exchange Information Flow







Use of New START-accountable assets for Payload Launch Vehicles (PLVs) and Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs)

- Army PLV and SLV programs that use accountable first-stage motors of SLBMs or ICBMs are subject to New START provisions
 - First-stage motors of Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, and Trident D5s are accountable
 - Must be launched from designated test range or space launch facility
 - No limit on the number of test ranges or space launch facilities
 - Stool and other soft launchers at these facilities are not counted under New START limits
 - Data transmitted from a PLV or SLV booster can be encrypted
 - Launch and movement notifications required
 - Depending on the launch parameters, system could be subject to inspections
- Trident I C4s are not subject to New START restrictions
 - Launch notification requirements required under the *1988 Agreement Between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles*
- The Army's Strategic Target System (STARS) could still be subject to launch restrictions as outlined under Article VII, paragraph 12 of the INF Treaty



Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)

- The Army has considerable equities in developing technologies for the USSTRATCOM requirement for a long-range conventional strike missile
- New START does not prohibit the development or deployment of CPGS systems
- The parameters of a strategic range CPGS system determine the likelihood of being subject to New START requirements
 - A CPGS system that utilizes an Existing-Type of ICBM or SLBM **would** be subject to New START delivery system limits, notification, inspection, basing, and telemetry requirements
 - A CPGS system that utilizes a commercial booster or a newly developed booster and flies a traditional ballistic trajectory to a range greater than 5,500 KM **is likely** to be subject to New START delivery system limits, notification, inspection, basing, and telemetry requirements
- It is the unilateral position of the U.S. that a CPGS system that utilizes technologies **not defined** in New START will not be subject to treaty requirements
 - U.S. is willing to discuss provisions in the BCC to mitigate potential Russian concerns over such a “new kind” of conventional system
 - The Army’s Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) program, which uses a boost glide vehicle concept, does not meet any New START definitions



Missile Defense Interceptors

- Current missile defense systems are not restricted by any New START provision
- Both parties acknowledge that there is an interrelationship between strategic missile defense systems and strategic offensive systems in promoting stability
 - For the purposes of New START, missile defense interceptors are defined as those systems capable of intercepting ICBMs, SLBMs, and their associated warheads
- Russia issued a unilateral statement that declared a qualitative or quantitative increase in U.S. missile defense capabilities could be grounds for its withdrawal from New START
 - Currently, U.S. tactical missile defense systems (PAC-3, SM-3, THAAD, and MEADS) have not demonstrated the capability of intercepting ballistic missile targets that fly either intercontinental ranges or at strategic velocities