SUMMARY

AR 525-92
Army Arms Control Implementation Policy

This new publication, dated 2 August 2010--

- Provides a broad overview of treaties and agreements with which the U.S. Army must implement and comply (paras 2-3 through 2-5).
- Establishes the policies, goals, and processes associated with the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of Army arms control implementation activities (chap 3).
- Establishes a single document that commands can reference to better understand the Army’s role in implementing and complying with U.S. arms control treaties and agreements (throughout).
History. This publication is a new Department of the Army regulation.

Summary. To fulfill responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of the Army in DODD 2060.1, this regulation establishes policies to ensure that all Department of the Army activities, including, but not limited to, research, tests, development, acquisition, exercises, and operations, comply with arms control agreements in accordance with United States law and other applicable national implementing policy.

Applicability. This regulation applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. It also applies to Department of the Army civilians. During mobilization or national emergency, this regulation remains in effect without change.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes a full analysis of the expected benefits and must include a formal review by the activity’s senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or senior leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through their higher headquarters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR 25–30 for specific guidance.

Army internal control process. This regulation contains internal control provisions and identifies key internal controls that must be evaluated (see appendix B).

Supplementation. Supplementation of this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited without prior approval from the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–SSD), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–0400.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–SSD), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–0400.

Distribution. This regulation is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels B, C, D, and E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

1–1. Purpose
This regulation defines Army arms control implementation and compliance (ACIC), identifies Army implementing agents, and establishes the policies, goals, and processes associated with the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of ACIC activities.

1–2. References
Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A.

1–3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms
Abbreviations and special terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary.

1–4. Responsibilities

a. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment). The ASA (I&E) is responsible for arms control implementation functions within the Department of the Army (DA). This responsibility is assigned by the Secretary of the Army. The ASA (I&E) provides oversight and advocacy for all ACIC policies, programs, and activities for the DA. The ASA (I&E) will—

(1) Provide central guidance for the development, dissemination, and implementation of policy for the direction, integration, and supervision of ACIC programs and activities.

(2) Oversee the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) reporting of destruction activities in accordance with any applicable international treaty requirements.

(3) Provide environmental, safety, and occupational health-related oversight for matters of chemical and biological agent destruction.

(4) Supervise the development of environmental and occupational health policies and standards for the Army explosives, biological defense research, and chemical agent programs.

(5) Monitor, assess, and interpret arms control implementation policies issued by the Department of State (DOS), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and other appropriate authorities.

(6) Ensure Army adherence to laws, policies, and regulations concerning compliance with, and implementation of, specific arms control agreements.

(7) Ensure that current and anticipated arms control compliance requirements, obligations, and constraints are considered as an integral part of the planning, operations, and acquisition processes of all Army programs and activities.

(8) Ensure the establishment, as appropriate, of detailed procedures or plans for implementing on-site arms control activities.

(9) Recommend new ACIC policies in the absence of appropriate guidance from higher authorities.

(10) Initiate changes to existing ACIC policies to better serve current U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives and obligations.

(11) Serve as the proponent of ACIC and thereby the primary responsible official and subject matter expert for associated materiel, personnel, and operations issues.

(12) Review the level of effort of ACIC programs and activities for consistency with U.S. national security objectives, international obligations, and planning priorities.

(13) Serve as the Army Implementation and Compliance Review Manager in accordance with DODD 2060.1 and represent the DA on DOD compliance review groups (CRGs), as required. As such, serve as the DA’s initial point of contact (POC) for Army arms control compliance issues.

(14) Develop and issue policy for safeguarding recovered chemical warfare material and oversee corresponding CWC reporting requirements in accordance with Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environmental Safety and Occupational Health (SAIE–ESOH) memorandum of 1 April 2009, Interim Guidance for Chemical Warfare Material Responses, and DODI 5210.65.

b. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology). The ASA (ALT) is responsible for ensuring that DA research, development, and acquisition activities comply with arms control obligations. The ASA (ALT) will—

(1) Ensure that the Army’s portion of the chemical demilitarization program complies with international treaty and domestic statutory requirements.

(2) Ensure that Army international activities, including cooperative development and export of weapons systems, comply with applicable arms control and weapons trafficking obligations.

(3) Exercise responsibility within DA for coordinating reports required under the Wassenaar Arrangement, as outlined in paragraph 2–4e.

(4) Exercise responsibility within the DA for coordinating reports required under the U.S.-Russia Arrangement on
Cooperation in Enhancing Control of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS, 2005), as outlined in paragraph 2–4f.

(5) Ensure that acquisition projects are reviewed for compliance in conjunction with the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8 (DCS, G–8), the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DCS, G–3/5/7), and the Army Implementation and Compliance Review Manager.

(6) Serve as the Secretary of the Army’s single executive for providing export policy oversight with respect to sale and transfer of items and technology, including—

(a) Tracking, validating, maintaining, and reporting data on exports of Army technologies, equipment, and munitions, as required by individual agreements and as prescribed by OSD.

(b) Coordinating export data with the Army Staff, or designated Army implementing agent (IA), as required.

c. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller). The ASA (FM&C) will ensure that Army organizations plan, program, budget, and allocate resources including personnel for arms control implementation and compliance.

d. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2. The DCS, G–2 has staff responsibility for treaty-related intelligence and counterintelligence policy activities. The DCS, G–2 will—

(1) Assess the foreign intelligence threat resulting from implementation of arms control agreements.

(2) Review data, media, and reports collected at Army sites or activities during inspections carried out under treaty regimes.

(3) On request, provide intelligence advice and assistance.

e. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7. The DCS, G–3/5/7 is the Army Staff proponent for implementation of and compliance with arms control agreements. The DCS, G–3/5/7 will—

(1) Notify Army Commands (ACOMs), Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) of impending inspections in accordance with established notification procedures.

(2) Serve as the DA’s focal point for operational planning and programming, to include—

(a) Developing and coordinating the Army positions on preparation for arms control implementation activities.

(b) Planning and directing the commitment of ACIC assets in support of Joint and interagency missions.

(c) Initiating the legal review process by submitting data to the Judge Advocate General on weapons or weapon systems submitted for review to the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) or other requirements staff officer teams.

(d) Providing strategic analysis pertaining to national security issues involving international and regional arms control treaties, agreements, and policies, and ensuring that ACIC conforms to DOD, Joint Staff, and national security policies and agreements.

(e) Notifying ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs of impending overflights of U.S. territories under the Open Skies Treaty as outlined in paragraph 2–3c.

(f) Serving as the Army IA for those treaties and agreements not otherwise assigned.

(3) Oversee the requirements staff officers responsible for review of Army capabilities documents for military need and risk including conformance with arms control agreements and assure that the review activities of the AROC include arms control issue areas.

(4) Oversee input to the Army Modernization Plan and Army Campaign Plan, including requirements staff officer teams when the synchronization of capability documents with the Army Modernization Plan and Army Campaign Plan are affected by questions of treaty compliance.

f. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4. The DCS, G–4 will ensure that plans for movements and transfer of weapons and munitions directly pertaining to the object of arms control agreements are reviewed for compliance with any arms control agreements and related policies, in coordination with the DCS, G–3/5/7.

g. Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8. The DCS, G–8 will—

(1) Oversee the future Army through programming, materiel integration, related HQDA studies, and directed external reviews.

(2) Shift approved Army requirements from the planning to the programming phase.

(3) When required, and with DCS, G–3/5/7 support, validate that planning and programming activities are in compliance with arms control agreements and related policies.

h. Director, Army Staff (Technology Management Office). The Director, Army Staff (Technology Management Office) will ensure that activities affecting special access programs are carried out in accordance with DODD O–5205.7 and DODI O–5205.11.

i. General Counsel. The GC will—

(1) Determine the DA’s position on any legal questions or procedures arising from international arms control treaties, implementing statutes and regulations, or issuing of specifying implementation.

(2) Provide oversight concerning legal review of Army arms control agreement implementation activities.

j. The Judge Advocate General. TJAG will—

(1) Review weapons or weapon systems in accordance with DODD 5000.01 and AR 27–53, to determine whether
the weapons or weapon systems or their intended use in combat are consistent with the obligations assumed by the U.S. Government (USG) under all applicable arms control agreements, other agreements, and customary international law.

(2) In coordination with the GC, provide legal review of ACIC activities.

d. Inspector General. The Inspector General will propose and conduct programs of inspection, including nuclear, biological, and chemical surety applicable to Army explosives, and chemical and biological defense research programs.

e. Chief, Public Affairs. The Chief, Public Affairs will conduct public affairs operations and public affairs aspects of arms control implementation, chemical demilitarization operations, and chemical and biological defense research programs.

m. Chief, Army Reserve. The CAR has staff responsibility for execution of all treaty implementation and compliance within the Army Reserve. As such, the CAR will—

(1) Serve as the lead official for policies and resourcing pertaining to the U.S. Army Reserve’s implementation of, and compliance with, applicable treaties.

(2) Ensure that U.S. Army Reserve Command units, installations, and activities are prepared to implement and comply with applicable treaties.

(3) Notify U.S. Army Reserve Command units, installations, and activities of treaty requirements and responsibilities.

n. Director, Army National Guard. The Director, ARNG has staff responsibility for the execution of treaty implementation and compliance plans within the ARNG. The Director, ARNG will—

(1) Ensure that ARNG units, installations, and activities are prepared to implement and comply with applicable treaties.

(2) Notify ARNG units, installations, activities, and tenants of treaty requirements and responsibilities.

o. Commanders of ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, and the directors of Army offices and agencies of HQDA. All commanders and directors are responsible for the management and execution of arms control implementation programs and processes for which their offices have functional responsibility. In addition, they will—

(1) Notify the regional ASCC and unified command or designated executive agent (as appropriate) of the planning and implementation of international arms control agreements.

(2) Coordinate data calls, information requests, notifications of arms control related activities, and implementation requirements as requested by proponents or IAs responsible for arms control implementation and compliance duties.

(3) Pursue a management philosophy approach, as defined in AR 5–1, to judge the efficiency and effectiveness of ACIC programs and activities. Ensure that management of ACIC programs and activities is consistent with the strategic planning and performance measurement requirements of Public Law 103–62.

(4) Inform ASA (I&E) and DCS, G–3/5/7 of all programmatic, administrative, operational, and implementation matters that have the potential to produce an impact on their organization’s ability to carry out ACIC policies. Contact ASA (I&E), TJAG or DCS, G–3/5/7 for assistance whenever there is question of a compliance concern.

(5) Ensure that all provisions and criteria available under the various arms control agreements are used as appropriate to avoid the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

(6) Ensure that all weapons or weapon systems programs undergo the legal review by TJAG and certification of treaty compliance in accordance with DODD 5000.01 and AR 27–53.

(7) Support, as required, the drafting and review of host nation support agreements that may be required for treaty activities at overseas locations.

(8) Ensure that all Army military and civilian and contractor personnel executing treaty duties are aware of the counterintelligence threat and reporting requirements under AR 381–12 with particular attention to paragraph 2–3c(4).

(9) Provide a copy of implementing documents to the DCS, G–3/5/7.

(10) Notify units, installations, and activities of treaty requirements and responsibilities.

p. Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command. The Commander, AMC will—

(1) Serve as the Army IA for the Chemical Weapons Convention, with responsibilities as outlined in paragraph 2–3d.

(2) Serve as the Army IA responsible for Army implementation under the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI), as outlined in paragraph 2–4a and the United Nations Transparency in Armaments (UNTIA), outlined in paragraph 2–4b.

(3) Through the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, prepare reports under the Wassenaar Arrangement, as outlined in paragraph 2–4e, and the U.S.-Russia Arrangement on Cooperation in Enhancing Control of MANPADS, 2005, as outlined in paragraph 2–4f.

q. Commander, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command. The Commander, SMDC/ARSTRAT—

(1) Serve as the Army IA for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty), and the New START Treaty (NST), with responsibilities as outlined in paragraph 2–3e.
(2) Serve as the Army IA for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, with responsibilities as outlined in paragraph 2–4d.

(3) Provides direct support to the OSD treaty manager for the Nuclear Arms Control Technology (NACT) Program to support U.S. monitoring activities under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as outlined in paragraph 2–5d.

\textit{r. Commander, U.S. Army Europe.} The Commander, USAREUR will—

(1) Serve as the Army IA for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), as outlined in paragraph 2–3a.

(2) Serve as the Army IA for Vienna Document 1999 (VDOC 99), as outlined in paragraph 2–3b.

(3) Notify Army units within the area of responsibility (AOR) of impending overflights under the Open Skies Treaty as outlined in paragraph 2–3c.

\section*{Chapter 2
Arms Control Policy Background}

\subsection*{2–1. Definition of arms control treaties and agreements}

Arms control treaties and agreements are bilateral or multilateral international agreements concluded by the United States for the purpose of limiting, eliminating, controlling, or preventing the proliferation of military arms and weapons, technologies, equipment, or production facilities and/or of dual-use technologies, equipment, or production facilities that may be used as or contribute to military and other war-making equipment.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{a.} Arms control treaties are formal international agreements, either bilateral or multilateral, entered into by the United States and one or more other States Parties. Treaties are subject to the Constitutional requirements for Senate advice and consent and, when ratified, have the force of law. In many cases, arms control treaties are enforced by U.S. statute.
  \item \textit{b.} Arms control agreements are normally international agreements, either bilateral or multilateral, entered into by the President or other Executive Branch officials that are not subject to Senate advice and consent and are not formally ratified. Agreements by Executive Branch agents with foreign governments are binding in international law and are equivalent in U.S. law to treaties. Although such agreements are sometimes described as “political,” under international and U.S. domestic law, they are generally considered to be binding. In some cases, arms control agreements may be enforced by U.S. statute.
  \item \textit{c.} Arms control treaties may have been concluded and signed but not ratified or entered into force. States that have ratified a treaty are bound by its provisions. States that have signed, but not ratified, a treaty are not bound but have some obligation to not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Where a treaty requires a certain number of ratifications to come into effect, those states that have ratified the treaty will not be bound until the required number of states have ratified, although they continue to have the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Arms control treaties that have been signed, but not yet ratified by the United States, will be complied with unless otherwise directed by the National Command Authority.
\end{itemize}

\subsection*{2–2. Role of arms control implementation and compliance in the national defense}

ACIC plays a crucial role in preserving and promoting U.S. national policy by eliminating or controlling weapons of mass destruction (WMD), by limiting or controlling some aspects of conventional weapons systems, and by limiting the abilities of actual or potential adversaries to threaten or attack U.S. forces.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{a.} ACIC is designed to meet the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, 10 USC, and 22 USC. Also, it is designed to fulfill the responsibilities of the Army and to ensure Army compliance with applicable treaties, international agreements, and specific statutory requirements.
  \item \textit{b.} U.S. participation in many treaties and agreements is designed to reduce or eliminate the possible use of WMD and other means in warfare or against civilian targets.
  \item \textit{c.} U.S. participation in treaties and agreements may be designed to limit the numbers or employment of particular weapons systems or classes of systems in order to promote international peace and stability.
  \item \textit{d.} U.S. participation in treaties and agreements may be designed to prevent or limit proliferation of weapons, weapons systems, or weapons-related technology by controlling or limiting international sale, export, or transfer of technology.
  \item \textit{e.} Failure to observe treaties and agreements may also subject U.S. corporations, Government agencies, and individuals to civil or criminal legal liability and action.
  \item \textit{f.} The DODD 2060.1 assigns responsibilities and provides policy guidance for DOD implementation of, and compliance with, arms control agreements of the USG. The DA is required to be fully compliant with arms control agreements of the USG, and for implementation of, and compliance with, arms control agreements using methods and practices that avoid the compromise of national security information. The Army is required to provide separate budget
presentations and justifications for all Army ACIC-related expenses. The Secretary of the Army assigned responsibility within the DA for arms control implementation functions to the ASA (I&E). As such, ASA (I&E) is the designated U.S. Army implementation and compliance review manager required by DODD 2060.1.

2–3. Treaties and agreements requiring verification by on-site inspection or overflight

a. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) is mandated by the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (Public Law 102–228). The CFE entered into force in November 1992 and is of unlimited duration. It limits the numbers of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft for each State Party located, or with forces assigned on the territory of other States Parties, in the territory from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

   (1) Each year, treaty signatories exchange information to report the numbers and locations of their forces. The CFE inspections verify the accuracy of this information.

   (2) The CFE inspections on U.S. Forces sites may be conducted by any non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) CFE State Party (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine). U.S. sites are most commonly subject to declared site inspections and challenge inspections.

   (3) The USAREUR is the Army IA for the CFE.

   (a) The USAREUR G3 International Operations Division (IOD) provides treaty compliance officers (TCOs) to assist site commanders and commanders of objects of verification (OOVs) with preparations for CFE activities. The TCOs coordinate with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) personnel and host state authorities on implementation responsibilities.

   (b) Each fall, in preparation for the annual exchange of information (AEI), the USAREUR TCOs, in coordination with the garrisons and the OOVs, conduct a 100 percent inventory of all conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty (CAEST). The USAREUR Treaty Data Manager consolidates the information, verifies it, and then forwards it to headquarters (HQ) U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). The USEUCOM receives and validates the inputs from all the Service components and forwards the consolidated report to the Joint Staff.

b. The Vienna Document, 1999. The Vienna Document, 1999 (VDOC 99) is a politically binding set of confidence and security building measures (CSBM), developed by the participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The VDOC 99 entered into force in January 2000 and is part of the OSCE’s larger political-military transparency framework, which includes the GEMI. The VDOC 99 requires an annual information exchange and an annual calendar exchange, both designed to increase transparency and security in order to decrease the potential for conflicts based on insufficient or incorrect information.

   (1) The annual information exchange, no later than 15 December, requires the United States to provide information for the next calendar year on—

   (a) Military forces, including information on command organization, strengths down to brigade/regiment level, planned personnel increases, amphibious formations, combat units in the zone of application, air formations, and combat units.

   (b) Holdings of major weapons and equipment systems.

   (c) Planned deployments of major weapons and equipment systems.

   (d) Defense planning includes written statements addressing national defense policy and doctrine, force planning, information on military budgets, and previous expenditures.

   (2) The annual calendar exchange, no later than 15 November, requires the United States to exchange, with all other participating states, an annual calendar of its upcoming military activities subject to prior notification. Exercises involving over 40,000 troops, or more than 900 battle tanks, or 2,000 ACVs, or 900 self-propelled or towed artillery pieces must be reported in this calendar, 2 years in advance.

   (3) As part of the compliance and verification regime, each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State within the zone of application for CSBM. Each participating State is obliged to accept up to three inspections on its territory during the calendar year. Each participating State is also obliged to accept a quota of one evaluation visit per calendar year for every 60 units reported in the Annual Exchange of Military Information.

   (4) The VDOC 99’s participating states are obliged to accept observers from all other participating states to observe activities involving 13,000 or more troops, 300 or more tanks, 500 or more ACVs, or 250 or more artillery, mortars, and multiple launch rocket system platforms over 100 mm. An amphibious or heliborne landing, or a parachute assault by airborne forces, will be subject to observation whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 3,500.

   (5) USAREUR is the Army IA.

c. Treaty on Open Skies. In order to strengthen peace, stability, and security, the treaty on Open Skies (OS) promotes openness and transparency of military forces and activities, helps monitor compliance with other arms control agreements, and assists crisis prevention and crisis management activities. The OS allows unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of each participating State Party. The OS entered into force on 1 January 2002 and gives all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information about the military forces of other participating States.
The Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood Area, MD (single small-scale facility (SSSF)).

Wood, MO (permitted protective purposes facility (PPPF)), and the Chemical Transfer Facility at the Edgewood

Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant; Prototype Detonation Test Destruction Facility; Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruc-

tion Facility; Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility; and Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility.

Facilities.

Depot; Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility; Pine Bluff Explosive Destruction System; Pueblo Chemical

agents as a method of warfare, and helping anyone to engage in activities prohibited by the convention.

States Parties from engaging in military preparations to use CW, using riot-control

and the convention entered into force on 29 April 1997. The CWC seeks to eliminate existing CW and deter their

spread in the future, and prohibits States Parties from engaging in military preparations to use CW, using riot-control

facilities.

The United States has destroyed or converted all its former CWPFs. Inspections at former CWPFs were

completed after destruction of the facilities was completed in 2007.

The CWC also contains provisions for short notice challenge inspections, which could be required at any Army

installation. As of the date of this publication, no challenge inspection has been executed under the CWC. The Army

maintains contingency planning for such an event.

The DCS, G–3/5/7 has responsibility for CW agreements and provides policy development, negotiation support,
ratification support, implementation planning, and compliance planning for chemical arms control treaties and agreements.

The AMC has designated the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) as the Army IA for CWC implementation and

chemical weapons destruction.

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The AMC has designated the Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) as the Army IA for CWC implementation and

chemical weapons destruction.
international peace and security, and to strengthen strategic stability. The SORT was negotiated between the United States and the Russian Federation during 2001–2002 with the goal of bringing about more substantial reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons than provided by START. On 5 December 2009, START expired, but, under an executive order, the United States will continue to abide by its provisions until a replacement treaty enters into force or there is a policy change. As of the date of this publication, negotiations between the United States and Russia are ongoing to conclude a new agreement, which is to be known as the NST. Upon ratification and entry into force, the NST will mandate significantly deeper reductions in strategic-range offensive delivery vehicles, warheads, and launchers. NST will also replace SORT reduction objectives upon entry into force. If the NST text is not agreed upon and ratified, the subsequent tasks and responsibilities specific to NST will be null and void.

1. The DA has cognizance and control of certain non-nuclear assets that were controlled under the provisions of START. Those assets are components, specifically excess first stage rocket motors, of former strategic nuclear missile systems, which are used in the Army’s Strategic Target System (STARS). The START reporting requirements for these assets will be eliminated under NST.

2. Under START, two Army installations (Camp Navajo, AZ and Goose Creek, SC) were subject to specific inspection provisions. Under NST, it is expected that only Camp Navajo will be subject to Tier Two inspections. Camp Navajo is a storage site for Navy and Air Force treaty-accountable rocket motors.

3. The DA uses certain treaty-accountable rocket motors as payload launch vehicles for several programs, and such usage is subject to START and NST provisions governing notification, telemetry, and launch location.

4. Under these treaties, the DA is required to provide regular reporting of certain assets and activities.

5. Commands are responsible for ensuring that special access programs under their cognizance, if any, prepare and maintain a specific operational plan for use in the event of accepted challenge inspections.

6. HQ, USASMDC/ARSTRAT is specifically responsible for assisting ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, agencies, and activities in preparing for all Army on-site inspections or visits, and for ensuring that applicable Army programs receive compliance certification from the DOD CRG.

f. U.S.–International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and additional protocol. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime is designed to monitor and verify both simple and complex nuclear activities to ensure they are being conducted solely for peaceful purposes. Bilateral safeguards agreements are established between the IAEA and individual States Parties, and on a voluntary basis for recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS) such as the United States. IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) agreements are negotiated to strengthen safeguards agreements, allowing IAEA inspectors greater access to information or locations and the right to conduct short notice inspections. The U.S.–IAEA AP entered into force on 6 January 2009.

1. Under the U.S.–IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the United States declared 270 facilities. Of those, the IAEA currently conducts monthly inspections at the Department of Energy (DOE) storage facility at Savannah River, SC.

2. Under the U.S.–IAEA AP, the United States has the right to manage access during inspection activities to protect national security, proprietary, and proliferation-sensitive information from inadvertent disclosure. Sites, facilities, and locations having direct national security significance are excluded from declaration and inspection under the U.S. National Security Exclusion (NSE), in the same way these locations were excluded under the U.S.–IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

3. DOD and defense-contractor facilities and activities/programs are excluded from declaration and inspection under the NSE. However, DOD activities/programs could be colocated with, or in proximity to, a non-DOD declared location. When this is the case, a site vulnerability assessment (SVA) will be conducted to determine whether a DOD activity/program could be vulnerable during inspection activities and whether additional protective measures should be applied.

4. The DCS, G–3/5/7 is the Army IA responsible for the implementation and compliance plan for the U.S.–IAEA Safeguards regime. Actions include—

   (a) Coordinating site surveys to determine Army activities or programs at risk during inspections at declared, non-DOD facilities.

   (b) Coordinating necessary SVAs at locations identified during the site surveys that cannot be protected through managed access. Coordination may include requests for arms control treaty-related survey and countermeasures planning support from DTRA.

   (c) Participating in the nuclear safeguards-implementation working group.

2–4. Treaties and agreements requiring reporting

a. Global Exchange of Military Information. The GEMI is an OSCE-sponsored information exchange (due no later than 30 April) that is a politically-binding agreement of unlimited duration. The GEMI is designed to promote openness and confidence-building among OSCE participants regarding their worldwide military force structures to help avert conflicts that may result from misinformation or misinterpretation of political-military intentions of participating states. The GEMI was first implemented in July 1995 and is part of the OSCE’s larger political-military transparency framework, which includes VDOC 99. The AMC is the Army IA responsible for GEMI implementation. The AMC responsibilities include—
(1) GEMI core components, including an annual exchange of information on the command structure, peacetime authorized personnel strengths, and holdings of major systems and equipment.

(2) Information sharing. The GEMI contains no limits or verification measures. Information is shared only with OSCE participating states, not with the public.

b. United Nations Transparency in Armaments. UNTIA is a voluntary information exchange through which states submit data annually (no later than 30 April) on imports and exports of arms in seven categories of equipment (battle tanks, ACVs, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles or missile systems) to the Register of Conventional Arms (The Register), established by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1991. UNTIA aims to improve international transparency related to arms transfers and holdings, to build mutual confidence, and to promote timely international consultations on potentially destabilizing regional arms buildups.

(1) The AMC is the Army IA responsible for implementation of UNTIA. The AMC responsibilities include—
   (a) Preparing instructions for Army elements for implementation and compliance.
   (b) Reviewing and submitting the Army UNTIA annual submission to DCS, G–3/5/7.

(2) Reporting data is sent to DCS, G–3/5/7 on a schedule coordinated by DCS, G–3/5/7. The DCS, G–3/5/7 is responsible for verification of data format and accuracy and for transmittal of data to the Joint Staff J–5.

c. Biological Weapons Convention. The BWC is a global ban on the use, development, production, stockpiling, and/or acquisition of biological and toxin weapons (BW), and the munitions, equipment, or means of delivery of biological and toxin weapons. Each signatory pledges to destroy all existing stocks of BW and implement national measures to prohibit the production of BW. The BWC entered into force in March 1975 and is of unlimited duration.

(1) In 1986, States Parties adopted legally binding confidence building measures (CBMs) in the form of voluntary annual data declarations. The United States remains committed to voluntary, yearly submission of BWC CBMs as a transparency measure. USG biological facilities prepare and submit information on their biological activities, facilities, and budgets.

(2) The DCS, G–3/5/7 is the Army IA responsible for coordination, collection and submission of Army BWC CBM information.

d. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The INF Treaty, negotiated in 1981 between the United States and the USSR, entered into force in June 1988 and is of unlimited duration. The INF Treaty strengthened strategic stability by eliminating intermediate-range (1,000–5,500 km range) and shorter-range (500–1,000 km range) ground launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) possessed by both States Parties under strict conditions of verification. The two states agreed to eliminate the missiles in three phases, with intrusive on-site inspections to support the elimination effort. The INF Treaty also prohibits the production, flight testing, and deployment of GLBMs and GLCMs systems in the 500–5,500 km range except for research and development (R&D) purposes.


(2) The United States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan continue to declare locations of static displays and enforce limitations on the research and development of booster systems, as well as provide launch notification of intermediate range booster systems for R&D purposes.

(3) The DA is required to semiannually provide input that the USG includes in an exchange of data with Russia, provide input for the annual compliance certificate, and provide 10 days’ advance notification of launches of booster systems restricted to only research and development.

(4) The STARS, which is derived from former Polaris A–3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), is considered an R&D booster subject to INF Treaty provisions.

(5) USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the Army IA for the INF Treaty.

(6) Relevant ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs are responsible for conducting an inventory of their holdings and reviewing their programs to ensure that they comply with the INF Treaty.

(7) HQ, USASMDC/ARSTRAT is specifically responsible for assisting ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, agencies, and activities to ensure that applicable Army programs receive compliance certification from the DOD INF Compliance Review Group.

(8) Reporting data is sent to DCS, G–3/5/7 on a schedule predetermined by DCS, G–3/5/7. The DCS, G–3/5/7 is responsible for verification of data format and accuracy and for transmittal of data to the Joint Staff J–5.

e. Wassenaar Arrangement. The WA is an arms export control regime established to promote transparency and to discourage nations from exporting sensitive military technologies to non-WA States. Through national policies, the WA attempts to ensure that transfers of sensitive items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that will undermine stability. The WA enhances cooperation to prevent states of concern from acquiring armaments and sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses. The WA framework document was agreed to by 33 member states in July 1996.

(1) The semiannual WA report contains unclassified information on dual-use technology and arms exports to non-WA countries only.
(2) Semiannual data exchanges are conducted on 30 April and 31 October.

(3) The ASA (ALT) is responsible for the coordination of WA data collection prepared by the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, and provides that information to DCS, G–3/5/7. The DCS, G–3/5/7 is the Army IA for WA.

f. Small arms and light weapons. The United States has robust small arms and light weapons (SALW) export control laws and regulations.

(1) The Army prepares reports on SALW and Man-Portable Air-Defense System (MANPADS) as required by: category eight of the Wassenaar Arrangement; the OSCE annual SALW data exchange; the DOS annual Arms Export Control lists; the Department of Commerce (DOC) annual Commerce Control Lists; and the quarterly exchange of information on the transfer of MANPADS and their components to third parties in accordance with the U.S.-Russia Arrangement on Cooperation in Enhancing Control of MANPADS (2005).

(2) The United States supports the Programme of Action (POA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, negotiated by the UN in July 2001, which requires participants to comply with the following:

(a) Make illicit small arms production/possession a criminal offense.

(b) Establish a national coordination agency on small arms.

(c) Identify and destroy stocks of surplus weapons, keep track of officially-held small arms, and issue end-user certificates for exports/transit.

(d) Notify the original supplier state of re-export, disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration of ex-combatants, including collection and destruction of their weapons.

(e) Support related regional agreements and encourage moratoria.

(f) Mark small arms at point of manufacture for identification and tracking.

(g) Maintain records of small arms manufacture.

(h) Engage in more information exchange.

(i) Ensure better enforcement of arms embargoes.

(j) Include civil society organizations in efforts to prevent small arms proliferation.

(3) DOS prepares a voluntary annual report on the implementation of the POA and submits it to the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs.

(4) The DCS, G–3/5/7 is the Army IA responsible for coordination of internal Army guidance on matters of arms control compliance, policy development, and issue resolution related to the implementation of the SALW Initiatives.

2–5. Treaties/agreements requiring no reporting or formal verification but that are binding on the Army

a. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The CCW was negotiated by the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) from 1979 to 1980, to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons employed in international conflicts that inflict excessive injuries or are considered indiscriminate. The CCW entered into force in December 1983, and the United States ratified the first two protocols in March 1995 and Protocols III, IV, and V in January 2009.

(1) Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons that injure by fragments undetectable by X-ray. The U.S. inventory does not contain any such weapons.

(2) Protocol II restricts the use of mines and booby traps, and was revised in 1998 with stricter prohibitions as the amended mine protocol (AMP). The United States ratified the AMP in May 1999. All of the provisions of Protocol II and the AMP have been incorporated into U.S. doctrine and practices, including prohibiting the use of nondetectable antipersonnel landmines (APL); requiring 90 percent of remotely delivered mines (RDM) to self-destruct within 30 days and 99.9 percent to self-deactivate within 120 days; requiring RDM locations to be recorded; requiring marking and monitoring of nonself-destructing minefields; and requiring the removal of mines when appropriate.

(3) Protocol III prohibits the use of incendiary weapons against civilian populations, and any targets that are not military objectives. It prohibits the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons and provides restrictions on the use of non-air-delivered incendiary weapons against military targets located in concentrated civilian areas.

(4) Protocol IV prohibits the employment of laser weapons specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision. Announced in 1995, the DOD Policy on Blinding Lasers (1997) is more stringent than Protocol IV, prohibiting development or employment of laser systems specifically designed to cause permanent blindness.

(5) Protocol V calls upon member states involved in a conflict to clear explosive remnants of war (ERW) within the territory under their control, to record and share information on ERW, and to take precautions to protect civilian populations and humanitarian organizations operating in areas affected by ERW.

(6) The DCS, G–3/5/7 is the Army IA responsible for coordination of internal Army guidance on matters of arms control compliance, policy development, and issue resolution related to the implementation of the CCW.

b. Cluster munitions control initiatives. Cluster munitions (CM) are a key part of Army tactical indirect fire weapons systems and provide the field commander with the unique ability to destroy time sensitive area and material targets with shock effect and lethality while expending fewer rounds than with unitary high explosive munitions. CM are composed of a single delivery system that contains anywhere from a few to hundreds of explosive submunitions that
are either launched from the ground or dropped by air to be dispersed over a targeted area. Army use and transfer of CM is regulated by DOD policy and U.S. legislation.

(1) The DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians (2008) has six main components—
(a) The active inventory of CM was examined and excess exceeding operational planning requirements have been identified. Beginning in June 2009 the military departments and combatant commands initiated the removal and demilitarization of the excess CM.
(b) Until the end of 2018, combatant commander (CCDR) authorization is required for any use by the U.S. military of CM with a failure rate greater than 1 percent unexploded ordnance (UXO) across all intended operational environments. This restriction applies equally to submunitions with self-destruct or self-neutralization capabilities.
(c) After 2018, CM with a greater than 1 percent UXO rate will not be used by the U.S. military.
(d) After 2018, CM sold or transferred by the United States must have a failure rate less than 1 percent, and the United States may only transfer CM to countries that agree only to use CM against clearly defined military targets and will not use CM where civilians are known to be present.
(e) The U.S. military will continue the present, longstanding stockpile surveillance program that has the objective of providing reliable munitions for training and combat.
(f) The U.S. military will continue to support Protocol V of the CCW through recording and reporting use of CM to aid removal.

(2) U.S. legislation currently constrains CM transfers. Public Law 111–8, which supersedes Public Law 110–161, imposes nearly identical restrictions to those in the 2008 DOD policy on the sale and transfer of CM during FY 2009. It also expands on the 2008 DOD policy by restricting the provision of military assistance for CM, issuance of defense export licenses, and the transfer or sale of CM technology unless: 1) the submunitions of the CM have a 99 percent or higher functioning rate; and 2) the agreement applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of the CM or CM technology specifies that the CM will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present. Each public law is applicable for the fiscal year of its issuance. Similar annual legislation is expected in the future.

(3) The DCS, G–3/5/7 is the Army IA responsible for coordination of internal Army guidance on matters of arms control compliance, policy development, and issue resolution related to the implementation of the CM initiatives.

c. Landmine control initiatives. The U.S. Landmine Policy (2004) is oriented towards relieving the most pressing humanitarian impacts of ERW, with a “mine-impact free” objective rather than a more costly “mine free” policy. The major elements of the U.S. Landmine Policy are—
(1) A firm, specific, and unconditional commitment that after 2010 the United States will not use persistent landmines of any type, neither APL nor anti-vehicle (AV) landmines.
(2) A commitment that any use of persistent AV landmines outside the Korean Peninsula between now and the end of 2010 will require Presidential authorization.
(3) The United States will no longer use any nondetectable landmine of any type.
(4) A concerted effort to develop alternatives to its current persistent landmines, both APL and AV, incorporating enhanced self-destructing, self-deactivating capabilities and control mechanisms, such as "man-in-the-loop" and on-off commands that would allow U.S. forces to recover the munitions.
(5) Support for a global ban on the sale or export of all persistent mines, with exceptions only for training deminers, improving countermine capabilities, and related activities.
(6) A U.S. APL export moratorium prohibits the export, sale, or transfer of U.S. APL to other nations. It also seeks to limit the manufacture, possession, and use of APL. Originally enacted in a U.S. statute in 1992 (Public Law 102–484) and in annual extensions thereafter, the prohibition was extended by Public Law 110–161 until 23 October 2014.
(7) The United States has also incorporated all requirements for the CCW Protocol II and Amended Mine Protocol into U.S. doctrine and practices.

(8) The DCS, G–3/5/7 is the Army IA responsible to coordinate internal Army guidance on matters of arms control compliance, policy development, and issue resolution related to the implementation of the landmine control initiatives.

d. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Negotiations for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) were conducted in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament from 1993 to 1996 with three major objectives: to prohibit nuclear tests or explosions of any kind; to contribute to nuclear nonproliferation; and to enhance international stability. The United States signed the CTBT in September 1996, but the U.S. Senate refused to consent to ratification in October 1999. U.S. ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force.

(1) The CTBT will be of unlimited duration and prohibits all forms of nuclear testing, including explosions for peaceful purposes.
(2) Verification will be achieved through the International Monitoring System (IMS), an on-site inspection regime, and CBMs.
(3) The Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) “builds, tests and provisionally operates” the monitoring systems and global infrastructure in preparation for treaty compliance verification.
Chapter 3
Army Arms Control Goals, Process, and Resource Allocation

3–1. Arms control implementation and compliance goals

The goals of arms control implementation and compliance (ACIC) are to establish an enduring basis for all planning, programming, and budgeting guidance relating to how the Army will implement and comply with all applicable arms control treaties and agreements, and corresponding U.S. laws and regulations, so as to provide necessary resources of all commands and officials charged with specific responsibilities for each arms control treaty or agreement, and contribute to U.S. objectives in sustaining arms control regimes. ACIC goals are designed to ensure compliance with U.S. international obligations, to promote international stability, and to encourage other nations to observe arms control obligations. The goals are to—

a. Promote U.S. compliance with the requirements of international arms control treaties and agreements.

b. Ensure that the Army and its personnel comply with the requirements of arms control treaties and agreements as implemented by U.S. law.

c. Identify any deviations from ACIC obligations on the part of Army or other U.S. forces, and any efforts by non-U.S. entities to exploit the rights and obligations provided under treaties and international agreements to expand access to U.S. facilities and information.

d. Protect U.S. Army forces in the field from the use of WMD or other weapons considered, under various treaty regimes, to be illegal for use in warfare.

3–2. Arms control implementation and compliance process

a. Establishment of processes and systems. It is incumbent upon the Army, based on treaty language, statute, and DOD directives, to establish processes and systems to provide resources and procedures to ensure Army compliance
with all applicable arms control treaties and agreements. The process described in this regulation is a systematic approach to establish priorities for commanders faced with arms control implementation responsibilities, and for HQDA to establish priorities for resources to meet obligations of the Army and its constituent elements. The process is to be used by all Army organizations to determine where and when they should concentrate their arms control implementation efforts. The process also establishes the tools and procedures Army organizations should use to achieve command, Army, DOD, national, and regional obligations and to satisfy accompanying objectives.

b. Premises and assumptions. The following premises and assumptions underlie the process—

1. ACIC activities are in the interest of the U.S. Army.

2. ACIC activities are mandated by international treaties and agreements, U.S. statute, and DOD instructions and directives. ACIC activities are subject to formal review by a variety of external authorities in DOD, other Executive Branch agencies, the Congress, and by other states and by international organizations.

3. U.S. interactions with other states and with international organizations and Army interactions with other militaries occur both bilaterally and multilaterally.

4. Army activities are under formal and informal observation and evaluation by a variety of non-Governmental and Governmental organizations both in the United States and abroad.

5. The ACIC activities are not static. Changes constantly occur both through reinterpretation of existing agreements and negotiation of new agreements, as well as because of various political and public relations pressures that affect U.S. policies and interests.

c. Process phases. The ACIC process consists of four phases: negotiation involvement, assessment, selection, and coordination.

1. **Negotiation involvement.** Negotiations for new arms control agreements or for interpretation of existing arms control agreements or issues, and reconsideration of agreements already in effect, is a constant, ongoing process. It is essential that the U.S. Army participate as required in ongoing negotiations through all appropriate available means, including supporting—

   (a) Army policy and planning meetings in response to specific taskings from higher authority to assess the impact of an actual or hypothetical requirement on Army activities/programs and/or to develop an Army position on an issue.

   (b) OSD working groups and compliance review groups constituted to develop coordinated DOD positions on specific issues or to address specific issues of interpretation and implementation.

   (c) Interagency working groups or other interagency forums constituted to develop overall U.S. Government positions on specific issues or broad policy guidance.

   (d) As required or directed to develop and present Army positions in ratification and implementation of treaties and agreements to the U.S. Senate as part of the advice and consent process, or to other Congressional bodies and committees.

   (e) As directed, while participating in the membership on U.S. delegations to international meetings devoted to implementation of existing agreements, to consider broad questions of international policy related to arms control.

   (f) As directed, while serving as formal representation in U.S. negotiating delegations for revision of existing treaties and agreements, or to negotiate new treaties and agreements. Involvement in policy development and negotiations will help to ensure that the Army is aware of new or changed ACIC requirements and guidelines before they are implemented or become binding. It will also enable the Army to assess ongoing policies and programs and to make reasonably required modifications as suggested by negotiations and other external events.

2. **Assessment.** The Army must assess the effect on Army policies and activities/programs of existing or new arms control treaties and agreements, including responsibilities and vulnerabilities created by inspection, visitation, observation, image and information collection, and reporting requirements. Assessment, normally coordinated and led by the DCS, G–3/5/7, is an essential step in defining measures to counter vulnerabilities, in determining what Army activities/programs are affected, in assigning responsibilities for implementation and reporting, and in ascertaining the resources required for ongoing implementation and compliance.

   (a) The first step of the assessment phase is a thorough legal and operational review to determine what specific obligations and/or prohibitions are placed on the Army and Army activities through U.S. adherence to a treaty or international agreement.

   (b) The second step is to determine responsibilities and issues for Army ACIC, notably for the commands or other units affected; the degree of effect or involvement on current or future operations, equipment, and technology; the budgetary and personnel costs of implementation and compliance; and the long-term implications for resources, force structure, operational doctrine, R&D, and acquisition.

   (c) The third step is identification of the command or unit best qualified and able to assume responsibility for Army ACIC policy and action, and to take measures as required for the formal assignment of responsibilities.

3. **Selection.** The selection phase matches one or more appropriate Army ACIC programs and activities to the goals or objectives required. Critical issues of compliance must be addressed first. Priorities in providing resources will be based on the following guidelines:

   (a) Mandated Army ACIC activities, resulting from international agreements or specifically directed by the chain of
command, including on-site inspections to be accepted and information or reports to be provided, will have priority for planning and providing resources.

(b) Activities that the Army is obligated to conduct in response to its Title 10 United States Code, Armed Forces, requirements or specific statute will have second priority for planning and providing resources.

(c) Activities that the Army is committed to implement or support in response to a requirement validated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), such as those appearing in the approved Theater Security Cooperation Plans or planning documents, will have third priority for planning and providing resources.

(d) All Army ACIC activities that do not meet any of the preceding criteria will have a lower priority for planning and providing resources, including those ACIC activities in which the Army is already involved and that are included in existing operational plans or planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE).

(e) The priorities of the combatant commanders will prevail when ACIC activities not incorporated in specific operational guidance compete for resources in only one AOR.

(f) Planning and providing resources for Army ACIC activities involving the allocation or reallocation of resources between AORs will be based on priorities established or as directed under specified circumstances. The ACIC program and activities involving the assets of more than one ACOM, ASCC, or DRU will be coordinated with ASA (I&E) prior to implementation. When necessary, offsetting program reductions will be based on priorities established by ASA (I&E) in coordination with DCS, G–3/5/7.

(g) No element of the Army should undertake an ACIC activity not authorized by the chain of command and not in direct implementation of obligations established by treaty, international agreement, or statute.

(h) Nothing in this regulation mandates, requires, or authorizes the release of classified information by or changes in the responsibilities of commanding officers.

(4) Coordination. The coordination phase has both static and dynamic elements, but for most purposes, the static elements of established ACIC activity reflecting obligations and activities in already existing treaties, international agreements, and statute will predominate.

(a) ACIC planning requires regular coordination among the various planners, executors, and participants in Army ACIC activities. Coordination is particularly important to the planning of activities, the measurement of progress, the assessment of problems, and adjustments to future ACIC activities.

(b) To ensure that Army goals in paragraph 3–1 of this regulation are being pursued effectively, the ASCC will report on the fulfillment of scheduled ACIC obligations; any deviations from scheduled activities; the conduct of any unscheduled activities whether or not authorized under treaties, international agreements, or statute; and any efforts by nonauthorized entities, both U.S. and non-U.S., to exploit the provisions of treaties, international agreements, or statute to obtain unauthorized access to Army activities, planning, or information. Reporting will be done directly to the interests functional ACOM or DRU on an as-required basis (with an information copy to DCS, G–3/5/7).

(c) All HQDA staff elements and functional ACOMs will notify the ASCCs and unified commands or designated executive agent (as required) concerning their contemplated, planned, and ongoing activities involving the requirements of Army ACIC in their AOR. The coordination is to ensure that Army ACIC activities are conducted in accordance with U.S. obligations and to ensure that additional resources or support can be provided if and when required.

(d) The ACIC activities planned for or conducted in one AOR that are likely to have a significant effect on matters in a second AOR will be coordinated with the ACOM or designated executive agent responsible for the second AOR. This is particularly important for activities that are normally unscheduled with regard to timing or physical extent, such as on-site inspections and over flights.

(e) Any new Army ACIC activities will be conducted in accordance with instructions coordinated by DCS, G–3/5/7 through the appropriate chain of command.

(f) The ACOM agencies will not, under any circumstances, attempt to interpret provisions of treaties, international agreements, or statute, particularly when non-U.S. individuals or agencies are involved. All questions of interpretation are to be referred to DCS, G–3/5/7, the Office of the Army General Council, or the International and Operational Law Division, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) (DAJA–I0), as appropriate.

3–3. Resource allocation

a. All Army ACIC activities must compete within the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) for resources (see AR 1–1 for a description of the PPBES and its process).

b. The DCS, G–3/5/7 and ASA (I&E) will coordinate and oversee the development of policy and regulatory guidance for all Army ACIC programs and activities, and will also coordinate and oversee the planning, programming, and budgeting for all Army ACIC programs and activities. The DCS, G–3/5/7 serves as the primary HQDA advocate for ACIC program and activity resources during the Army program objective memorandum (POM) and budget building processes. Although the DCS, G–3/5/7 and the ASA (I&E) directly manage only a portion of total ACIC program and activity resources, the DCS, G–3/5/7 will serve as the primary HQDA advocate for all ACIC programs and activities through the PPBES. In performing this function, the DCS, G–3/5/7 must rely upon information provided by the ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs in preparing for the PPBES process.

c. The ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs, notably those designated as proponent agencies or offices, are the primary
implementers of the Army’s ACIC programs and activities, and are responsible for developing, justifying, presenting, and defending resource requirements that support their assigned ACIC programs and activities; ensuring that their approved budget programs are properly executed; and assessing their program performance. The DCS, G–3/5/7 will provide specific guidance about future requirements and activities to ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs when necessary. The identification of requirements needed to support ACIC programs and activities in the POM submissions, including the Commander’s Narrative Assessment, is critical to ensuring that these programs and activities compete successfully for Army resources. As part of the process, the ACOM, ASCC or DRU will assess the effect on Army vulnerabilities if adequate resources are not provided and will provide those assessments to DCS, G–3/5/7 for use during all phases of the PPBES. The ACOM, ASCC or DRU will emphasize, as appropriate, the importance of ACIC programs and activities in supporting the Title 10 USC, Armed Forces, Title 22 USC, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, international treaties and agreements, and other statutory responsibilities of the Army. To ensure maximum understanding of their requirements, the ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs will maintain an active dialogue with DCS, G–3/5/7 throughout the PPBES.
Appendix A

References

Section I

Required Publications

This section contains no entries.

Section II

Related Publications

A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this publication.

AR 1–1
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System

AR 5–1
Total Army Quality Management

AR 5–22
The Army Force Modernization Proponent System

AR 10–16
Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency

AR 10–87
Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units

AR 11–2
Management Control

AR 12–1
Security Assistance, International Logistics, Training, and Technical Assistance Support Policy and Responsibilities

AR 25–30
The Army Publishing Program

AR 25–55
The Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act Program

AR 27–53
Review of Legality of Weapons Under International Law

AR 70–1
Army Acquisition Policy

AR 73–1
Test and Evaluation Policy

AR 190–13
The Army Physical Security Program

AR 190–51
Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitive and Nonsensitive)

AR 340–21
Army Privacy Program

AR 360–1
The Army Public Affairs Program
AR 380–5
Department of the Army Information Security Program

AR 380–10
Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives

AR 380–381
Special Access Programs and Sensitive Activities

AR 381–12
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army

AR 381–14
Technical Counterintelligence

AR 381–47
Offensive Counterintelligence Operations

AR 385–10
The Army Safety Program

AR 530–1
Operations Security

AR 550–51
International Agreements

AR 690–11
Use and Management of Civilian Personnel in Support of Military Contingency Operations

CJCSI 2030.01B
Chemical Weapons Convention Policy Guidance

CJCSI 2110.01D
International Transfer of U.S. Defense-Related Technology and Munitions

CJCSI 2320.01C
Guidance for the Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 and Associated Documents

CJCSI 3500.01D
Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States

CJCSN 3500.01
2009–2010 Chairman’s Joint Training Guidance

DAGO 2002–03 as amended by DAGO 2009–03
Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army, 9 July 2002

DODD 2060.1
Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements

DODD 2060.02
Department of Defense Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy

DODD 5000.01
The Defense Acquisition System

DODD 5111.14
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (ASD (ISP))
DODD 5134.08  
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD (NCB))

DODD 5160.05E  
Roles and Responsibilities Associated with the Chemical and Biological Defense Program

DODD O–5205.07  
Special Access Program Policy

DODD 5230.11  
Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations

DODD 5530.3  
International Agreements

DODI 5000.02  
Operation of the Defense Acquisition System

DODI O–5205.11  
Management, Administration, and Oversight of Department of Defense Special Access Programs

DODI 5210.65  
Minimum Standards for Safeguarding Chemical Agents

Fact Sheet  
Department of State, U.S. Landmine Policy, dated 27 February 2004

JP 3–0  
Joint Operations

JP 3–40  
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

Secretary of Defense Memorandum  
Department of Defense Policy on Blinding Lasers, dated 17 January 1997

Secretary of Defense Memorandum  
Department of Defense Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians, dated 19 June 2008

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Memorandum  
Planning Assumptions for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Treaties and Agreements for Fiscal Years 2007–2013, dated 31 May 2006

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Memorandum  
Program Review by Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions compliance review groups, dated 17 January 2006

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Memorandum  

National Policy  
National Military Strategy of the United States of America, dated 1995

National Policy  
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, dated 1987

PL 101–510  
Section III
Prescribed Forms
This section contains no entries.

Section IV
Referenced Forms

DA Form 11–2–R
Internal Control Evaluation Certification Statement

DA Form 2028
Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms

Appendix B
Internal Control Evaluation Checklist

B–1. Function
Use this internal control evaluation checklist for Army arms control implementation and compliance (ACIC) and associated planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of ACIC activities.

B–2. Purpose
Use of this checklist assists ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, and where appropriate their commanders and acquisition officials with key internal controls. It is not intended to cover all controls.

B–3. Instructions
Answers must be based on the actual testing of key internal controls (for example, document analysis, direct observation, interviewing, other). Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and corrective action indicated in the supporting documentation. Internal controls must be evaluated every 5 years. Certification that the evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on DA Form 11–2–R (Internal Control Evaluation Certification Statement).

B–4. Test questions
The test questions below are designed so that a negative answer indicates a potential internal control weakness.

   a. Is there an ACIC proponent for the command designated in writing?

   b. Are there written ACIC plan(s), standard operating procedures, or continuity and succession reference materials? Is there a procedure for maintaining the currency of ACIC plans?

   c. Are separate budget presentations and justifications maintained for all Army ACIC related expenses? Are copies provided to DCS, G–3/5/7 for use by the Army ACIC management decision package manager during planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) activities?
d. Is there ACIC-related accountable or reportable property? If so, is that property managed in accordance with existing Army guidance governing property accountability?

e. Are there ACIC-related manpower authorizations and are they managed in accordance with existing Army guidance applying to manpower management?

B–5. Supersession

None. This is an original checklist in conjunction with the first issuance of AR 525–92.

B–6. Comments

Help make this a better tool for evaluating internal controls. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7 (DAMO–SSD), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–0400.
Glossary
Section I
Abbreviations

ACIC
arms control implementation and compliance

ACOM
Army Command

ACV
armored combat vehicle

AEI
annual exchange of information

AMC
U.S. Army Materiel Command

AMP
amended mine protocol

AOR
area of responsibility

AP
Additional Protocol

APL
anti-personnel landmines

AR
Army Regulation

ARNG
Army National Guard

AROC
Army Requirements Oversight Council

ASA (ALT)
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)

ASA (FM&C)
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)

ASA (I&E)
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment)

ASCC
Army Service Component Command

AV
anti-vehicle

BW
biological and toxin weapons

BWC
Biological Weapons Convention
CAEST
conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty

CAR
Chief, Army Reserve

CBM
confidence building measures

CCDR
combatant commander

CCW
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

CD
Conference on Disarmament

CDTF
Chemical Defense Training Facility

CFE
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty

CJCS
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CM
cluster munitions

CMA
Chemical Materials Agency

COCOM
combatant command(s)

CONUS
continental United States

CRG
compliance review group

CSBM
confidence and security building measures

CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization

CTIC
Center for Treaty Implementation and Compliance

CW
chemical weapons

CWC
Chemical Weapons Convention
CWDF
chemical weapons destruction facility

CWPF
chemical weapons production facility

CWSF
chemical weapons storage facility

DA
Department of the Army

DCS, G–2
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G–2

DCS, G–3/5/7
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, G–3/5/7

DCS, G–4
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G–4

DCS, G–8
Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, G–8

DOC
Department of Commerce

DOD
Department of Defense

DOE
Department of Energy

DOS
Department of State

DRU
Direct Reporting Unit(s)

DTRA
Defense Threat Reduction Agency

ERW
explosive remnants of war

GC
General Counsel

GEMI
Global Exchange of Military Information

GLBM
ground launched ballistic missiles

GLCM
ground launched cruise missiles

HQ
headquarters
POA
Programme of Action

POC
point of contact

POM
program objective memorandum

PPBE
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution

PPBES
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System

PPPF
permitted protective purposes facility

R&D
research and development

RDM
remotely delivered mines

SA
Secretary of the Army

SAEDA
Subversions and Espionage Directed Against the U.S. Army

SALW
small arms and light weapons

SAV
special access visit

SLBM
submarine-launched ballistic missile

SORT
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

SSSF
single small-scale facility

STARS
Strategic Target System

START
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

SVA
site vulnerability assessment

TCO
treaty compliance officer

TJAG
The Judge Advocate General
Section II

Terms

Active quota
The number of inspections one state party can conduct against another, as opposed to a passive quota, or the number of inspections a state party must receive.

Army Command (ACOM)
An Army force, designated by the Secretary of the Army (SA), performing multiple Army Service Title 10, Armed Forces, functions across multiple disciplines. Responsibilities are those established by the SA.

Army Service Component Command (ASCC)
An Army force, designated by the SA, comprises primarily operational organizations serving as the Army component of a combatant command (COCOM) or subunified command. Command responsibilities are those assigned to the combatant commander (CCDR) and delegated to the ASCC and those established by the SA.
Chemical Demilitarization Program (CDP)
The program to safely destroy all U.S. chemical warfare materiel, managed by the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA).

Compliance Review Group (CRG)
The Department of Defense working group designed to conduct an executive-level review of compliance issues. Established for each arms control agreement as needed. Meets on an ad hoc basis to address critical issues.

Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM)
CSBM are activities such as notifications, exchanges of observers, prior notification of military movements, and visits by observers. CSBM were first introduced in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 to reduce the dangers of armed conflict, misunderstanding, or miscalculation of military activities. Many of these features are now embedded in arms control and other agreements in the form of data exchanges/declarations, missile launch notifications, inspection activities, and voluntary presentation for national technical means.

Direct Reporting Unit (DRU)
An Army organization comprised of one or more units with institutional or operational support functions, designated by the SA, normally to provide broad general support to the Army in a single, unique discipline not otherwise available elsewhere in the Army. DRUs report directly to a HQDA principal and/or ACOM and operate under authorities established by the SA.

Implementation and Compliance Review Manager
Represents the DA on the DOD Compliance Review Group (CRG) as required and serves as the Army’s initial point of contact for Army arms control compliance issues.

Implementing agent (IA)
The organization assigned lead responsibility for internal Army coordination of implementation and compliance actions required by an arms control treaty or agreement.

International Monitoring System (IMS)
International system that comprises a worldwide network of facilities for seismological and radionuclide monitoring, including certified laboratories, hydroacoustic, and infrasound monitoring for events associated with possible nuclear test activities pursuant to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Data is transmitted to the International Data Centre and is available to all treaty partners.

Managed access
The use of methods, other than granting full access, to protect critical information while demonstrating compliance with an arms control treaty or agreement. Whenever less than full access is provided, the inspected party is obligated to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate compliance by alternate means; for example, by partially removing a shroud or by showing inspectors convincing photos or documentation related to the compliance concern rather than granting physical access to an area.

National security exclusion (NSE)
A legal provision of the U.S. Additional Protocol (AP), the United States will permit the IAEA to apply the provisions of the Protocol "excluding only instances where its application would result in access by the Agency to activities with direct national security significance to the United States or to locations or information associated with such activities."

Passive quota
The number of observation flights or on-site inspections each state party is obliged to accept as an observed or inspected state party. Treaties such as the Treaty on Open Skies and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe have quotas.

Permitted protective purposes facility (PPPF)
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a State Party approved facility producing schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes and in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10kg per year. A state party may have one such facility outside a single small scale facility.

Single small-scale facility (SSSF)
Under the CWC, a state party approved facility producing schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes. Production will be carried out in reaction vessels in production lines not configured for continuous operation. The Chemical Weapons Convention requires that the volume of such a reaction vessel will not
exceed 100 liters, and the total volume of all reaction vessels with a volume exceeding 5 liters will not be more than 500 liters.

Special access visit (SAV)
Under START provisions, one or more of the Signatories (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States) may request a special session of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), the treaty’s implementation body, and request a SAV for the purpose of resolving a compliance concern at any facility located on the territory of another signatory. SAVs are not restricted to declared locations, nor are they subject to quotas.

Strategic Target System (STARS)
The U.S. Army’s Strategic Target System (STARS) is a Polaris A1 SLBM with an Orbus I third-stage. Under START Agreed Statement 29, STARS is exempt from all START provisions and is captured under Article VII, paragraph 12, of the INF Treaty as a R&D system. Under the INF Treaty’s Article IX, paragraph 6, the United States is required to provide notification to Russia for launches from INF R&D sites. The notification is to be transmitted at least 10 days prior to the launch. The launch notification should contain the schedule date, launcher location, planned range of the test flight, and dispersion cross-section.

Site vulnerability assessment (SVA)
A mission conducted by a team of arms control security experts with specialized backgrounds to evaluate a site to determine its susceptibility to arms control implementation activities and to perform risk analyses and develop specific, cost effective, security countermeasures recommendations.

Section III
Special Abbreviations and Terms
This section contains no entries.