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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE FOR CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE (JPEO-CBD)

SUBJECT: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Installation
Protection Urgent Requirements Capability Document

1. The Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (JRO-CBRN) Defense validates the Urgent Requirements Capability Document as defining the interim requirements providing a CBRN installation protection capability.
2. Current operational requirements documents exist for CBRN detection, warning and protection of personnel, contamination avoidance, and response to mitigate the impact of a CBRN attack for warfighters; however, these systems are not currently fielded or integrated onto DOD installations to protect the warfighters, support personnel, and other individuals who work or live on DOD owned or leased installations. As a result, an interim system that adds a suite of these capabilities to a DOD installation or facility is required to fill this operational gap.
3. Request the evaluation of potential material solutions against the capabilities outlined in the enclosure, in order to rapidly provide a solution to the Services' urgent requirement for this capability.
4. The point of contact is LTC Sandra Wood, Joint Requirements Office - CBRN Defense, (703) 602-0876, fax (703) 602-0941, email: sandra.wood@js.pentagon.mil.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. G. Mathis", with a horizontal line above it.

M. G. MATHIS
RADM, USN
Director, Joint Requirements Office
for Chemical, Biological, Radiological
and Nuclear Defense

Enclosure

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ENCLOSURE

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Installation Protection Urgent Requirements Capability Document

1. References:

- a. Department of Defense Directive 2000.12 "DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program," 18 August 2003.
- b. DOD Directive 5200.8 "Security of DOD Installations and Resources," 25 April 1991.
- c. DOD Regulation 5200.8-R "DOD Physical Security Program," 13 May 1991.
- d. DOD Instruction 2000.14 "DOD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures," 15 June 1994.
- e. DOD Instruction 2000.16 "DOD Antiterrorism Standards," 14 June 2001.
- f. DOD Instruction 2000.18 "Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines," 4 December 2002.
- g. Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation Program Decision Memorandum 1, 12 December 2002.
- h. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, "Preparedness of U.S. Military Installations and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Attack," 5 September 2002.
- i. Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum "Implementation Plan for the Management of Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP)," 22 April 2003.
- j. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J8 JRO-CBRN Defense "Department of Defense Concepts of Operation for CBRNE Defense Supporting U.S. Military Installation and Facility Preparedness." Draft.
- k. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J8 JRO-CBRN Defense "User Guidance for the Execution of the Installation Preparedness Program," 1 October 2003.
- l. JRCOM 163-02, 9 September 2002.
- m. DIA validated Chemical and Biological Warfare Capstone Threat Assessment, DI-1650-83-02, February 2003.
- n. Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, "Installation Commanders' Blueprint, Installation Preparedness for Weapons of Mass Destruction," May 2001.
- o. HQ TRADOC ODCSDEV, Draft Installation CBRNE Force Protection Concept, 12 December 2002.

2. This capability document addresses the urgent operational need to fill an integrated CBRN installation protection capability gap against CBRN terrorist attacks. The overarching criteria for this capability is to protect personnel, maintain critical mission capability, and quickly resume essential functions. This provides military installations a limited capability to detect the CBRN incident, warn and protect personnel, avoid contamination, and respond to mitigate the impact of a CBRN attack.

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3. Statement of urgent capability need.

- a. Problem: Currently, installations have fielded only a very limited integrated CBRN Defense capability. Most installations lack sufficient chemical, biological and radiological detection, identification, and warning capability.
- (1) Installation emergency responders have only a limited capability to detect and identify a CBRN event. They also lack an effective capability to perform immediate restoration operations to re-establish essential operations. Most installation emergency responders lack the capability to survey, monitor, mark, and control a CBRN incident or event.
 - (2) Law enforcement/Security Forces and medical responses and capabilities are not well equipped, trained, or integrated with fire and HAZMAT response capabilities to respond to a CBRN incident.
 - (3) Emergency responder restoration and decontamination capabilities are not sufficient to effectively deal with anticipated personnel and casualty requirements from a terrorist use of CBRN.
 - (4) Medical emergency responders require equipment to treat significant numbers of chemical casualties on site. This includes appropriate medical countermeasures and supportive care.
 - (5) Installations are not equipped to maintain critical military operations following a CBRN event, lacking both collective and individual protection.
 - (6) Operational requirements documents exist for warfighter CBRN defense capabilities: however, these operational documents do not address requirements for military installations worldwide. As a result, an incremental CBRN defense system, which provides a CBRN protection capability for military installations, is required to fill this operational gap.
- b. Justification: This capability is driven by the CBRN terrorist threat to installations as expressed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum reference 1a above. This provides an interim capability within available funding (Reference g).
- c. System Description: This integrated CBRN installation protection capability, consists of GOTS and COTS for detection, identification, warning, reporting, decision support, individual protection, collective protection, decontamination and medical protection, surveillance, and response. The capability leverages existing emergency response, physical security, communications and infrastructure to minimize the impact on installation operations and support requirements.

- d. Operational Concept. Provide the installation commander the capability to protect personnel, maintain critical mission operations and resume essential operations as quickly as possible. This capability requires equipment, operational procedures, sustainment, and employment procedures that together provide an integrated CBRN protection capability as outlined in references j and k. Installation commanders will integrate CBRN inputs with inputs from emergency response, physical security, intelligence, meteorological data, local operations and other available assets to make determination of appropriate response and notification of installation population and facilities. The capabilities for each installation will be based on DOD-wide CBRN standards/definitions, and specific installation risk analysis that considers installation size, location, configuration, allocated procurement and sustainment funds, and mission. When operational, the system provides adequate detection, protection, and response capability.
- e. CBRN Protection Capabilities Required: Installation CBRN protection may consist of detection, identification, warning, reporting, protection, decision support tools, decontamination, medical countermeasures, medical diagnostics, and medical surveillance tailored to each installation.
- (1) Detect and Identify CBRN incidents on an installation.
 - (a) Ability to detect and discriminate categories of standard chemical warfare agents e.g. V, H, G series agents.
 - (b) Ability to detect and identify toxic industrial chemicals that may pose a significant hazard to an installation.
 - (c) Ability to presumptively detect and identify biological warfare agents
 - (d) Provide a method to determine confirmatory biological agent identification from environmental and clinical samples.
 - (e) Ability to detect radioactive emitters in vehicles, containers, on terrain and in facilities.
 - (f) Emergency responders must have the capability to conduct rapid and effective interior and exterior surveys of potential CBRN contamination and to identify the source material. They must also have the capability to preserve source materials for more definitive assessment.
 - (2) Warn and report a CBRN attack and the presence of contamination.
 - (a) Provide multiple means to rapidly warn the installation, particularly selected locations/personnel critical for operations.

- (b) Provide the ability to report a CBRN attack to higher headquarters, federal, state and local governments within 30 minutes of the notice of attack.
- (3) Protect personnel, maintain critical military missions, and resume essential operations.
 - (a) Provide protective equipment and/or collective protection to mission critical personnel to support continuous operations. OSHA/NIOSH approved personal protective equipment (PPE) will be used where appropriate.
 - (b) Provide appropriate protective equipment for emergency response personnel. OSHA/NIOSH approved PPE will be used where appropriate.
 - (c) Avoid and remove/neutralize CBRN agents on affected areas (e.g. personnel, equipment, and terrain), if necessary.
- (4) Provide appropriate medical protection, diagnosis, and treatment for CBRN effects.
 - (a) Provide a medical surveillance capability that automates aggregation of patient data for population health assessment and casualty reporting and detects abnormal syndromic trends associated with the dissemination of hazardous materials on or near the installation.
 - (b) Ability to perform rapid diagnosis from clinical specimens.
 - (c) Provide medical protection (pre and or post exposure prophylaxes) to mission critical personnel.
 - (d) Provide a medical reach back capability (e.g. telemedicine or teleconsultation links, etc.) to support diagnosis and treatment of personnel.
 - (e) Provide therapeutics for CBRN casualties.
- (5) Be compatible with existing installation power and communications systems, tailored to intended installations.
- (6) Decision Support Tools. Provide commanders and staff with CBRN decision aids to support planning, training and timely decision-making. Decision support tools must be compatible and interoperable with each Service's Emergency Management and/or Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) command and control systems.

- (7) Ensure all installation emergency response personnel have training necessary to respond to a terrorist CBRN attack. This is to include training on specific emergency response equipment as well as integrated emergency response training to familiarize appropriate installation personnel of applicable TTPs and command and control procedures. The integrated training should include a practical installation-wide exercise. Training and exercises must be tailored to complement each Service's existing emergency response training and exercise programs.
- f. Organizational Concept: This capability may require some modification of installation manpower requirements. At the discretion of the installation commander, this interim capability will protect personnel, maintain critical operations, and resume essential operations.
- g. Procurement Objective: This capability will meet a near-term interim installation capability for CBRN protection. In coordination with the appropriate agencies, Services, testing community, and the materiel developers, the acquisition community will conduct a military utility assessment of the capability in order to make a fielding decision. This will enable the Chemical and Biological Defense Program to validate the capability of the system and field a demonstrated capability for installation CBRN protection. This capability solution will remain valid for two years after a successful fielding decision and will require JRO-CBRND revalidation thereafter.
- h. Support Requirements:
 - (1) All support items must be available either through standard military supply channels, Government Service Administration (GSA), or Commercially Off-the-Shelf (COTS).
 - (2) An initial 90-day supply of consumables to support the installation CBRN protection.
 - (3) Personnel operating and maintaining this system will receive training in operation and maintenance of the equipment (e.g. new equipment training).
 - (4) Provide one-year contractor logistics support which can be transferred to the Services after the first year.
 - (5) Systems and equipment procured should minimize the logistics and Sustainment requirements on the installation.
4. Recommendation: In concert with the initial fielding of these critical installation protection assets, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense will initiate installation analysis, site surveys, and procurement activities. The Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Defense will initiate analysis to support development of capability documents for CBRN Installation Protection.